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INTRODUCTION
Despite women's1 recent gains in fields that have been histori-
cally dominated by men, the upper reaches of most professions
remain disproportionately male.2 Thus, although the percentage
of female lawyers, professors, and middle managers has risen
steadily, the percentage of female law partners, tenured professors,
and senior executives is still much lower than many would expect.'
Some call this phenomenon the "glass ceiling." Others call it a
t B.A. 1986, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Pennsylvania.
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'Although my discussion will focus on women, most of the analysis is equally
applicable to people of color. For women of color the analysis is even more
applicable. A growing body of literature on "intersectionality" discusses the unique
relationship between women of color and the law. See generally Paulette M. Caldwell,
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365
(discussing the legal acceptance of discrimination against African-American women
in the context of employer prohibition of braided hair); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-
disciimination Doctrine, Feminist Theoy, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139 (noting the prevalence of viewing race and gender discrimination as mutually
exclusive); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1990) (arguing that the current feminist theory, by trying to create a
unified voice, has tended to exclude the voice of African-American women); Marlee
Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989)
(attempting to reexamine white feminist theory from the perspective of women of
color).
2 See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
' See Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163,
1178 (1988) (noting that women in law, academia, and management have not moved
into "the positions of greatest power, prestige, and economic reward").
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"plateau." But whatever its name, it is keeping productive members
of the work force underemployed and unrewarded.
While there are many possible explanations for this persistent
problem, the courts are at least partly responsible. As the courts
assumed a more active role in scrutinizing employment decisions for
lower-level jobs, those jobs became more accessible to women and
minorities.4 Despite their professed concern for equal opportuni-
ties at the upper levels of employment,5 the courts do not scrutinize
upper-level employment decisions as closely as lower-level employ-
ment decisions. When the position at stake is a prestigious white-
collar job, courts tend to defer to the employer, expressing fears of
second-guessing the employer or infringing on the employer's
professional judgment.6
The courts' deference in this area is not wholly unjustified.
Employment decisions for upper-level jobs are virtually always based
on subjective judgments of candidates' talents and abilities.7 These
types of decisions can be more difficult to review than typical lower-
level employment decisions, which can usually be based on objective
factors such as words typed per minute or widgets assembled per
hour. This difficulty inherent in reviewing upper-level employment
decisions, however, does notjustify abdication of the duty to uphold
Title VII's proscription against employment discrimination." Nor
should a concern for taking too much discretion out of employers'
hands keep the courts from acting. Rather, the courts should
develop an analytical system that can identify and address the
individual and institutional biases that affect employers' decisions.
' See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VIIto Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 947, 948 & n.1 (1982) (noting that lower-level jobs have become more available
to African-Americans and members of other groups that have been traditionally
discriminated against).
' See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Soils-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,527 (3d Cir. 1992)
(noting that upper-level subjective decisions are not "insulated fromjudicial review"),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 174
(3d Cir. 1991) ("[N]o special deference is to be paid to the tenure and promotion
decisions of universities when they are scrutinized under Title VII ... ."), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
6 See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1193-94 (discussing courts' deference to employer
judgment); see also Bartholet, supra note 4, at 967-78 (citing and discussing cases
which show courts' reluctance to scrutinize upper-level employment decisions).
"See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate "because of" race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Pub. L. No.
88-352, §§ 701-18, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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A legal framework that recognizes and condemns such biases would
create incentives for employers to restructure their decision-making
in ways that would minimize the impact of those biases, while still
preserving a great degree of employer discretion over upper-
echelon employment decisions.
This Comment examines the courts' failure to address upper-
level employment discrimination effectively and proposes a solution
that would allow them to do so. Part I describes the sociological
and psychological factors that create subtle barriers to women's
advancement in the upper levels of most professions. Part II
explains how the courts' refusal to scrutinize the intricacies of
upper-level employment decisions has made it nearly impossible for
upper-level plaintiffs to prevail on Title VII claims. Part III
proposes a Title VII analysis that would permit courts to scrutinize
upper-level employment decisions without unnecessarily limiting
employer discretion. By closely analyzing the elements of subjective
decision-making systems, the courts can better distinguish between
those employers who have reduced the influence of gender bias in
their employment decisions and those employers who have not. In
this way, courts can apply Title VII scrutiny to upper-level employ-
ment decisions without forcing employers to abandon valid
subjective criteria.
I. WHY THE GLASS CEILING PERSISTS
Although the statistics describing women's presence in upper-
level jobs9 vary from source to source, the persistence of a sizable
disparity between the presence of men and women in such jobs is
unmistakable. From a recent review of the corporate headquarters
of ninety-four Fortune 1000 companies, the U.S. Department of
Labor estimated that although women represented 37.2% of all
employees, they represented only 16.9% of those at all levels of
' Many positions do not lend themselves to easy categorization as either upper-
level or lower-leveljobs. There is, however, an unmistakable yet unspoken difference
in the way courts approach employment discrimination claims depending on the
socioeconomic status of the job at stake. One important distinguishing factor is the
level of discretionary decision-making that a position involves. Alternatively, the
dichotomy adopted by Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, who first documented this
difference in legal treatment, is still relevant. Under Bartholet's framework, blue-
collar jobs, including supervisory and highly skilled craft jobs, as well as white-collar
jobs with limited status and power are treated as lower-leveljobs. Middle- and upper-
managementjobs, professional positions, and otherjobs requiring advanced degrees
are considered upper-level jobs. See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 948 n.2.
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management and 6.6% of executive-level managers.1 0 A 1990
survey by the UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management and
the executive search firm Korn/Ferry International found similar
statistics, concluding that minorities and women hold less than five
percent of the top executive positions in the one thousand largest
U.S. corporations, a figure only slightly higher than it was in 1979,
when they held fewer than three percent of such positions." In
1991 the Feminist Majority Foundation predicted that it would take
475 years for women to reach equality with men in executive
positions if the present rate of progress were to continue.
1 2
Part of this disparity may be due to real or imagined differences
between the way women and men pursue their careers. This view
attributes the lower achievement levels of professional women to the
fact that women, more often than men, interrupt their careers to
raise children and prefer to sacrifice work in order to spend more
time with their families.1 3 Thus, women may consciously or
unconsciously choose jobs that are less demanding on their time,
and therefore less powerful and less financially rewarding. Others
explain the disparity as a mere temporary phenomenon resulting
from the lag time needed for recent women entrants into the job
market to work their way up to the most prestigious positions.
1 4
These arguments, however, only partially explain the persistent
gap between men and women in upper-level jobs. Observers
ranging from feminist scholars to the Bush Administration Labor
Department agree that women's underrepresentation in the elite
ranks of their professions is not solely due to their preferences and
work habits. The U.S. Department of Labor's recent report on the
glass ceiling phenomenon concluded that "the progress of minori-
10 
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIvE 6 (1991).
The statistics were equally disturbing for racial and ethnic minorities. While racial
and ethnic minorities represented 15.5% of all employees, they represented only 6.0%
of those at all levels of management and only 2.6% of executive level managers. See
id.
1 See id.
12 See ANN M. MORRISON ET AL., BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING 7 (updated ed.
1992) (citing THE FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, EMPOWERING WOMEN IN BUSINESS
2 (1991)).
1 See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1181;Jaclyn Fierman, Why Women Still Don't Hit the
Top, FORTUNE,July 30, 1990, at 40,54 (noting that "virtually every woman interviewed
for [the] article acknowledged the heavy-and sometimes painful-demands ofjuggling
family or personal life and the fast track").
" See, e.g., Fierman, supra note 13, at 42 (noting that "the average CEO is in his
mid-50s and most business schools began admitting women in significant numbers
only in the early 1970s, which puts them around fortysomething today").
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ties and women in corporate America is affected by more than
qualifications and career choices." 5  The report noted that
"[w]hile some assert that minorities and women have neither been
in the workforce long enough, nor have the needed credentials, the
vast majority of available research information points to artificial
barriers as a significant cause for why minorities and women have
not advanced further in corporate America." 6 An increasing body
of evidence suggests that men and women approach their careers
more similarly than most people assume.' 7  Deborah Rhode,
Professor of Law and Director of Stanford University's Institute for
Research on Women and Gender, argues that the barriers to
women's professional advancement cannot be explained as mere
"cultural lag or employee choice," but rather result from a combina-
tion of intentional discrimination and "more subtle forms of
socialization patterns and institutional structures that the law has
politely overlooked.""8
A. Social and Psychological Factors That Affect
Women in Upper-Level Jobs
In order to fully comprehend why the law's efforts to eliminate
gender discrimination have been only partially successful, one must
understand the social and psychological factors that cause discrimi-
nation in upper-level jobs. As the following discussion demon-
strates, discrimination that affects upper-level women is often
unintentional and unconscious. Because discrimination in the
executive suite differs from discrimination on the factory floor, it is
not surprising that legal doctrines designed with lower-level jobs in
mind do not adequately address upper-level discrimination.
1. Unconscious Tendency to Promote Socially Similar People
One disadvantage that women face at the upper levels of most
professions is that many people prefer colleagues who are similar to
themselves. As long as men make up the overwhelming majority of
high-level professionals, they will probably continue to promote
other men more often than they promote women unless they are
15 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 10, at 4.
16 Id. at 18.
See MoiusoN ET AL., supra note 12, at 69 (noting that "women are remarkably
similar to men in their characteristics, abilities, and motives").
18 Rhode, supra note 3, at 1180.
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held accountable by being forced to justify their employment
decisions. This preference to work with similar people may simply
be the result of men feeling most comfortable when they are around
other men. Research has shown that "'top executives tend to
promote people into leadership positions who are as much like
them as possible'" because they are "'simply more comfortable with
and seem to gravitate toward people like themselves.
' " 19
Organizational studies have shown that leaders are "likely to
show preference for socially similar subordinates and help them get
ahead."2" Thus, in a bureaucratic corporation, managers tend to
"rely on outward manifestations to determine who is the 'right sort
of person. '"'2 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, a professor of business ad-
ministration at Harvard Business School and a noted expert on
organizational behavior, explains this phenomenon:
Because of the situation in which managers function, because of
the position of managers in the corporate structure, social
similarity tends to become extremely important to them. The
structure sets in motion forces leading to the replication of
managers as the same kind of social individuals. And the men who
manage reproduce themselves in kind.22
This tendency to promote people who are similar may be even
more pronounced as one climbs the professional ladder. The desire
to work with those who are similar results from an attempt to
reduce the amount of uncertainty in the workplace. 23 The more
discretion a job entails, the more the person performing that job
must be trusted, and decision-makers feel most comfortable trusting
people similar to themselves. In high-level jobs, where uncertainty
abounds, it becomes crucial that "decision-makers [be able] to work
together closely in at least the harmony of shared understanding
and a degree of mutual trust."24  Thus, "[w]e expect a direct
'9 MORIuSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 125 (quoting Basia Hellwig, The Breakthrough
Generation: 73 Women Ready to Run Corporate America, WORIUNG WOMAN, Apr. 1985,
at 148, 148).
20 ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 47-48 (1977);
see also Fierman, supra note 13, at 42 ("It may seem surprising in an era sometimes
labeled postfeminist, but working closely with the opposite sex continues to make
many male executives uncomfortable.").
21 KANTER, supra note 20, at 48. One commentator described this tendency for
men to reproduce themselves in their own image as "homosexual reproduction." Id.
(citing WILBERT MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 109 (1962)).
2 Id.
2 See id. at 53.
24 Id.
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correlation... between the degree of uncertainty in a position-the
extent to which organizations must rely on personal discretion-and
a reliance on 'trust' through 'homosocial reproduction'-selection of
incumbents on the basis of social similarity."
2 5
2. Inferior Work Assignments
Another commonly cited impediment to women's success is the
inferior work assignments they often receive. The low expectations
for achievement that upper-level men often have for women may
partially explain this phenomenon. 6  Whatever the cause, less
demanding assignments can negatively affect women's performance.
The district court judge in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen
noted this phenomenon. 92 As one of the firm's partners admitted,
Nancy Ezold, whom the firm denied partnership, was penalized
because she had been given inferior assignments:
[T]he perception that she is not able to grasp complex issues or
handle complex cases ... appears to be a product of how Sy
Kurland viewed Nancy's role when she was initially hired. For the
first few years Sy would only assign Nancy to non-complex matters,
yet, at evaluation time, Sy, and some other partners would qualify
their evaluations by saying that Nancy does not work on complex
matters. Nancy was literally trapped in a Catch 22. The Chairman
of the Litigation Department would not assign her to complex
cases, yet she received negative evaluations for not working on
complex cases.
28
The American Bar Association has noted this phenomenon as well.
A recent report by its Commission on Women in the Profession
states that "women are receiving different types of case assignments
from those given to men, and are sometimes steered away from
major litigation [and] commercial matters."29 It is not surprising
' Id. at 54; see also Fierman, supra note 18, at 42 (quoting a partner at a
headhunting firm who notes that corporate males are "not really sure the women will
come through for them. Theyjust don't trust them as much as the guys with whom
they talk football.").26 See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
' 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
"Id. at 1179 (quoting a letter from a partner concerned about Ezold's situation
to the firm's Executive Committee); see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 10, at
5 ("([C]areer enhancing assignments ... were often not as available to minorities and
women.").
29 COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 11 (1988).
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that women succeed less frequently than men at the upper levels of
employment when the evidence indicates that they are not given the
same chances as men to prove themselves.
3. Gender Stereotypes
Stereotypes about women's abilities and aspirations also
influence their ability to obtain upper-leveljobs.3 0 A stereotype can
be defined as a judgment or assessment of an individual based on
generalizations about a group to which that individual belongs.
3 1
Women professionals face stereotypical views of women as well as
stereotypical images of the traits necessary to succeed in certain
professions. For instance, if litigators are stereotyped as being
aggressive males, a woman who is not perceived as aggressive will
not be expected to succeed. This may be true even if in reality
successful litigators are not necessarily aggressive or male.
3 2
Since jobs become associated with certain groups of people
through past experience, jobs that have historically been performed
by men tend to be considered "men's work." Studies show that the
current proportions of men and women in different occupations
significantly influence societal beliefs about who should pursue those
occupations."s In one study, ninety-five bank supervisors were
asked to make promotion decisions from hypothetical personnel
files in which the qualifications were equal but the gender was
varied. The supervisors decided to promote the men far more often
than the women.
3 4
50 See Fierman, supra note 13, at 42 (citing a recent survey of Fortune 1000 CEOs
in which 80% of the respondents said that there were barriers keeping women from
reaching the top and 81% of the CEOs who acknowledged the barriers named
"stereotyping" and "preconceptions" as the most important problems). See generally
Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345 (1980) (discussing stereotyping in the
workplace in the context of employment discrimination law).
" The generalization may be true as to the group, although not necessarily true
for the individual. It also may be "only partially or not at all true." Mary F. Radford,
Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions ofPower, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471,
487 (1990). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the American
Psychological Association filed an amicus curiae brief outlining the consistent
research on sex stereotyping, noting that over 300 articles had appeared on the
subject between 1974 and 1987. See Radford, supra, at 486 nn.58-59.
" This type of bias is known as a "prototype" because it results from the "images
associated with members of a particular occupation." Rhode, supra note 3, at 1188.
s See e.g., Radford, supra note 31, at 491.
See id. at 492 (citing Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Influence of Sex
Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 9, 11 (1974)).
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The characteristics assumed to be necessary in certain types of
workers often conflict with the characteristics assumed to be present
in certain types of people. Thus, the stereotype that litigators must
be aggressive would not negatively affect employers' judgments of
women without the additional stereotype that women are not
aggressive. Although few would argue that there are no differences
between the sexes, 5 it is becoming increasingly apparent that
judging people by their gender is often both inaccurate and
destructive. Adjectives typically used to describe men include
aggressive, independent, unemotional, competitive, analytical,
assertive, and self-reliant. Adjectives typically used to describe
women include gentle, quiet, yielding, loyal, shy, cheerful, neat, and
understanding.-3  Thus, studies reveal that the stereotypical
characterizations of males typically match the commonly held
perceptions of "good managers," whereas the stereotypical
characterizations of females do not. 7
It is not surprising that women have difficulty succeeding in
upper-level jobs given the two sets of contradictory stereotypes with
which women must contend. If a woman wants to be a successful
litigator, should she be aggressive, to fit the stereotype of a litigator,
or demure, to fit the stereotype of a woman? To advance in their
careers, women must simultaneously conform to certain masculine
traits and certain feminine traits. If a woman displays too much
masculinity she will be called overbearing and demanding; if she
displays too much femininity she will be called weak and unasser-
tive."8 A recent work on the glass ceiling noted what was required
of the women executives who had succeeded:
It was essential that they contradict the stereotypes that their male
' See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 800 (1989)
("Gender differences do exist: that is, men as a group differ from women as a group
not only on the basis of biological 'sex' differences, but on the basis of social 'gender'
differences."). See generally CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIPEERENT VOICE (1982) (discus-
sing differences between female and male modes of thinking regarding relationships,
identity, and morality); Robin West,Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1
(1988) (arguing that women, by virtue of the possibility of pregnancy, are connected
to human life in ways that men are not).
m See Radford, supra note 31, at 494.
37 Id. at 487;see also Rhode,supra note 3, at 1182 (discussing the disparity between
the perceptions of ideal women and of successful professionals).
- Arlene Johnson, who directs work force studies at the Conference Board, a
business research organization in New York, notes the difficulty this phenomenon
creates for women: "'It's as if we're being asked to play a Beethoven sonata in two
octaves.'" Fierman, supra note 13, at 46-47.
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executives and coworkers had about women-they had to be seen
as different, "better than women" as a group. But they couldn't
go too far, to forfeit all traces of femininity, because that would
make them too alien to their superiors and colleagues. In essence,
their mission was to do what wasn't expected of them, while doing
enough of what was expected of them as women to gain accep-
tance. The capacity to combine the two consistently, to stay within
a narrow band of acceptable behavior, is the real key to success.3
9
Because women are forced to fit their behavior into a narrow range
of acceptability, whereas men are not, women are being held to
standards that differ substantively from those to which their male
colleagues are held. This gender-specific standard is no less
destructive simply because many of those who enforce it do so
unconsciously.
4. Unequal Performance Standards
Evidence suggests that just as stereotypes cause employers to
scrutinize women's personality traits differently than men's, gender-
based preconceptions lead employers to scrutinize women's
professional performance more harshly than men's. Many observers
report that women are required to perform better than men to
achieve the same level of success. For example, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor reports that women professionals felt "they were not
held to the same performance measures as men and believed that
they had to work twice as hard."4 ° Corporate insiders admit that
"[w]omen are... expected to be extremely competent, often even
more competent than men in a number of respects"4 and that the
"women who are successful in their company had been screened
very, very thoroughly.., more thoroughly, in fact, than the men as
a whole." 42 Kanter reports that professional women-even those
who did not consider themselves victims of discrimination-
recognized this phenomenon when they admitted "that they felt
they had to 'work twice as hard' and expend more energy than the
average man to succeed."
41
39 MORRISON ET AL., supra note 12, at 54-55.
40 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PIPELINES OF PROGRESS: AN UPDATE ON THE GLASS
CEILING INrTIATIvE 35 (1992).
4 1 MORRISON ET AL., supra note 12, at 58.
2Id. at 59.
' KANTER, supra note 20, at 238-39.
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Expectations of failure may also affect women's promotability
and performance. The American Bar Association's Commission on
Women in the Profession recently noted a difference in the
presumed capabilities of men and women when it reported that
"women must prove their competence, while men must prove their
incompetence."44 Indeed, "[w]omen report[ed] that they are often
treated with a presumption of incompetence, to be overcome only
by flawless performance, whereas they see men attorneys treated
with a presumption of competence overcome only after numerous
significant mistakes."45 This expectation that women will fail not
only requires women to perform better in order to be recognized,
but may very well influence them to perform worse, because low
expectations of success often become self-fulfilling prophecies.
46
Even when women perform as well as men, studies suggest that
their achievements often are not credited in the same way as men's.
For example, men's success is more likely to be explained by ability
and their failure by bad luck. Women's success, on the other hand,
is likely to be explained by good luck while their failure is likely to
be explained by lack of ability."' Because evaluations of ability are
extremely important for hiring and promotion decisions, this
difference can be devastating to women's careers. 8
5. Personal Connections
Evidence suggests that the comparatively low availability of
sponsors or mentors for women may be another factor that nega-
tively affects their career prospects at the upper levels. Although
finding a sponsor is important for managers of both genders,49 it
may be even more crucial for women.5" These mentors, whether
acting formally or informally, help women to appear more influen-
tial and powerful, provide behavioral advice, and even help win
promotions.5 ' Unfortunately, finding a sponsor may be more
difficult for women than for men. As one candid corporate insider
pointed out, the problem is identification: "Boy wonders rise under
44 COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 29, at 4.
4Id. at 12.
46 See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1189 (arguing that low expectations, as reflected by
lower salaries and less demanding assignments, result in poor job performance).
47 See id. at 1188-89.
48 See id. at 1189.
4 See KANTER, supra note 20, at 181.
50 See id. at 183.
51 See id.
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certain power structures. They're recognized by a powerful person
because they are very much like him. He sees himself, a younger
version, in that person.... Who can look at a woman and see
themselves?"
5 2
Women's careers may also suffer because women tend to have
fewer opportunities to form informal social networks with their
colleagues. In a 1987 survey, executive women cited "old boy
networks" as a common form of subtle discrimination. 3 These
"networks" may take the form of female law associates not being
included in the poker games with male partners or female sales
representatives not being invited to the golf game with the male
regional vice president. 4 Such social exclusion can occur even in
the office. As one female vice president noted, "'It's tough. The
ways I am excluded are very subtle.., before meetings or during
the break, I am often left by myself while the men chat with each
other.' "5 5 Although such oversights may seem inconsequential at
first, they can often be critical when accumulated over the course of
an entire career. These unofficial gatherings frequently represent
the chance for deals to be struck or professional connections to be
cultivated.
Attorney Elizabeth Hishon's suit against the prominent Atlanta
law firm of King and Spalding 6 exemplifies this subtle barrier for
women.5 7 One of the ways King and Spalding attempted to justify
denying her partnership was by pointing out that she did not
socialize enough, was too quiet and reserved, and "'just didn't fit
in. ' " " The partners with these complaints, however, did not
consider the possibility that the firm's atmosphere may have
contributed to Hishon's failure to participate enthusiastically in the
firm's formal and informal social gatherings. Before Hishon's
arrival, the firm had employed only one female attorney in its
52 Id. at 184.
53 Gregory B. Northcraft & Barbara A. Gutek, Point-Counterpoint: Discrimination
Against Women in Management-Going, Going, Gone or Going but Never Gone?, in WOMEN
IN MANAGEMENT 219, 224 (Ellen A. Fagenson ed., 1993).
' See Fierman, supra note 13, at 54 (describing a female executive who attended
an executive outing, only to find that the luncheon grill was located in an extension
of the men's locker room).
s Northcraft & Gutek, supra note 53, at 224.
See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
17 See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1190.
'James Stewart, Are Women Lawyers Discriminated Against at Large Law Firms?,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1983, at 1, 17 (quoting a member of the firm's hiring
committee).
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ninety-nine-year history,59 and the partners had arranged a swim-
suit competition for its summer associates while Hishon's lawsuit
was pending, awarding a prize to the female "'body we'd like to see
more of.'"6"
6. Life as a Token
As already discussed, it may be more difficult for women to
succeed in traditionally male professions because the actual
distribution of the sexes in ajob affects perceptions of who should
be performing that job.61 Being part of a small minority at work
can have other detrimental effects on women's careers as well.6 2
Whether men outnumber women or Whites outnumber Blacks, the
problem of tokenism remains the same. It is the condition of being
the few among the many; it is the "rarity and scarcity" that has an
effect.
63
Kanter has identified several difficulties associated with being a
token in the workplace that are particularly problematic for upper-
level women. First, they are seen simultaneously as representative
of their category (especially when they fail) and as unusual excep-
tions (especially when they succeed). Second, while they are
constantly made aware of the differences between themselves and
the majority, they also must pretend that those differences do not
exist. Third, they are made to feel visible and "on stage," but are
kept away from the backstage "where the dramas are cast." Fourth,
during times such as social events when the majority are the most
relaxed, tokens may experience the highest degree of stress. Finally,
despite the fact that many suffer from a sense of isolation, they may
feel pressure to dissociate from others who are like them.
64
What is most worrisome about tokenism is that it seems to be
59 King and Spalding's first female attorney, Antha Mulkey, started at the firm as
a secretary to partner Hughes Spalding and retired in 1977 without ever being
considered for partnership. Hishon, who was hired in 1977, was the first woman to
be hired as a regular associate. See id.
o Id. at 1 (quoting one of the firm's partners).
61 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
62 See KANTER, supra note 20, at 206-42 (discussing the particular problems
confronting tokens); Rhode, supra note 3, at 1191 (discussing gender biases faced by
token women).
"6 KANTER, supra note 20, at 207.
64 See id. at 239; see also Rhode, supra note 3, at 1191 (discussing the problems
facing professional token women).
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self-perpetuating.6 5 Women tokens feel pressure not to associate
with other women, leading them to fail to help other women or
even to try actively to keep out new women. Meanwhile, unsuccess-
ful women tokens give the organization an excuse not to hire new
women, unless those new women are so unusually talented that they
are clearly different from most other women. Because the men in
power may prefer working with other men,6 6 they are unlikely to
go to great lengths to hire more women absent strong pressure to
do so. Because tokenism is self-perpetuating, "outside intervention
is required to break the cycles created by the social composition of
groups."
67
7. The Power of Unconscious Bias
Most of the discriminatory barriers facing women in upper-level
employment are erected unintentionally and unconsciously.6 The
tendency for managers to reproduce themselves is probably not
pursued consciously. 69 Most people whose judgments are skewed
by stereotypical ideas of the way women and men should behave are
unaware that they are not being completely impartial. 7' Few
decision-makers consciously expect women to perform better or
work harder than men in order to achieve the same degree of
success. 71 Unfortunately, unconscious biases can impede women's
careers as effectively as consciously erected barriers. In fact, since
antidiscrimination law addresses conscious biases more effectively
than unconscious biases, 72 unconscious biases may be even more
harmful to women.
6 See KANTER, supra note 20, at 241.
6 See id. at 241-42; see also supra part I.A.1.
67 KANTER, supra note 20, at 242.
" See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1188 ("Although... doubts [about the competence
of women] are no longer generally aired in polite company, they still emerge in
studies of unconscious bias."). Rhode explains that unconscious gender bias
manifests itself in three ways: (1) prototypes, the images we associate with people
who perform certain jobs; (2) schema, the "personal characteristics and situational
factors" that we use to understand people's behavior; and (3) scripts, the way we
define appropriate conduct in a certain situation. Id.; see also Charles R. Lawrence
III, The 1d the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing the prevalence of unconscious bias in the race
discrimination context and examining its implications for antidiscrimination law that
focuses on discriminatory intent).
69 See supra part I.A.1.
7o See supra part I.A.3.
71 See supra part I.A.4.
' See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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B. Institutional Factors
Whereas the factors described above demonstrate the ways in
which individual decision-makers can affect women's success,
institutional practices can, to a great extent, control the impact that
these individual biases will have on high-level employment decisions.
The systems and policies that shape the workplace as an institution
can go far to mitigate or compound the destructive effects of these
individual biases.
Is the environment at work conducive to frank discussions about
biases and stereotypes? Does management make it clear that efforts
to reduce bias will be rewarded? Are decision-makers required to
articulate specific reasons for their decisions and judge candidates
based on clearly defined criteria? Are they encouraged to think
about whether their decision might have been inadvertently
influenced by improper considerations? The answers to these
questions have a crucial impact on the extent to which women can
thrive in the upper levels of a particular workplace.
The pervasiveness of subjective employment criteria is one
institutional factor that significantly affects women's experiences in
the upper strata of the professional world. Powerful and prestigious
jobs typically require complex skills that can only be measured
subjectively.7" Thus, whereas decisions about lower-level jobs fre-
quently are based on objective criteria such as words typed per
minute, decisions about upper-level positions often depend on
subjective assessments of the candidate's previous performance and
future potential.7 4
Because subjective decision-making gives the decision-maker
considerably more personal discretion, the process becomes more
susceptible to the expression of the unconscious biases outlined
above. 5 Industrial psychologists, aware of this tendency, warn
personnel directors to pay careful attention to the dangers of
subjective rating systems.76 Their concern arises from the poten-
tial for these amorphous criteria to be distorted by the evaluator's
personal biases as well as by problems such as spotty observation by
the evaluator and unequal chances for the employee to demonstrate
See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 955.
7 See id.; Radford, supra note 31, at 483-84.
See supra part I.A.76 See DONALD L. CARUTH ET AL., STAFFING THE CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATION
229 (1988); WAYNE F. CAscIo, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 66
(3d ed. 1987).
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proficiency." Both of these factors were apparently at work when
Nancy Ezold's inferior work assignments denied her adequate
exposure to partners, which in turn affected her evaluations.
78
Legal scholars have also warned that subjective decisions are
susceptible to the influence of stereotypes and biases. Elizabeth
Bartholet commented that "[s]ubjective systems ... allow for the
expression both of conscious bias and of the unconscious bias that
is likely to result in the exclusion of persons who are visibly
different from those doing the selecting."79 Mary Radford also
noted this phenomenon: "When looking for leaders in law firms,
accounting firms, or newsrooms, decision-makers search for more
than just physical ability or technical competence. Personal
attributes take on prime importance. Stereotypical notions of how
persons of each gender should or will act (or look or dress) then
become determinative. " " Because upper-level jobs are more likely
to be filled on the basis of subjective judgments, women vying for
upper-level jobs are more likely to suffer the effects of unconscious
biases than women competing for lower-level jobs.
Thus, the social and psychological factors that affect women's
actual and perceived performance can have varying degrees of
impact on ultimate employment decisions, depending on whether
the institution takes steps to control the influence of biases in its
decision-making processes. While an employer may not be able to
control the personal biases influencing an individual decision-
maker, the employer can and should adjust the institutional
framework in order to minimize the impact of those biases.
Although no employer could ever completely eliminate the
subjectivity involved in upper-level employment decisions-nor
should an employer want to-employers can eliminate excess
amounts of personal discretion. In this way, the institutional
framework can encourage the individual actors to make more
reasoned, fair, and unbiased decisions.
7 See CASCIO, supra note 76, at 66.
78 See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79
(E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
Bartholet, supra note 4, at 955.
o Radford, supra note 31, at 484.
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II. THE COURTS' RESPONSE
A. The Current State of Employment Discrimination Law
1. Title VII
The courts' attempts to eliminate the disadvantages facing
women in upper-level employment have not been completely
successful."' This effort began with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2 which made it unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate "because of" race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Title VII was the first significant national effort to eliminate
employment discrimination.8 4 For the first time the federal courts
s" Seegenerally Bartholet, supra note 4 (arguing that courts have applied a different
standard when evaluating discrimination in upper-level and lower-leveljobs); Radford,
supra note 31 (analyzing cases in which professional women were denied promotions
because they were perceived as lacking the personal qualifications required for upper-
level jobs).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
83The statute states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
§ 2000e-2(a). It is interesting to note that "sex" did not appear in the original draft
of the bill and seems to have been included almost by accident. See Tracy L. Bach,
Note, Gender Stereotyping in Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance of Evidence
and Causation Under Title VII, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1251, 1256 n.23 (1993). House
Report 7152, later called the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was introduced by Representa-
tive Emanuel Celler onJune 20,1963, without the word "sex." The amendment that
added the word "sex" was introduced by Representative Howard Smith, an opponent
of the bill, while the bill was before the House Judiciary Committee, in an apparent
effort to defeat the entire bill. No organization petitioned Congress to add the word
"sex," nor was there any testimony on the amendment before the Judiciary
Committee. See id.
' Previous federal laws had been unsuccessful at solving the problem. The Equal
Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988)), was too narrow, addressing only wage discrimination where the two sexes
performed "equal work." The National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198,49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)), addressed
discrimination only indirectly, as part of the union's duty of fair representation.
Executive Orders, such as the effort to eliminate discrimination by government con-
tractors, only applied to a small number of employers. See, e.g., Exec. Order No.
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had the responsibility of reviewing the employment practices of
most of the nation's employers.
8 5
2. Individual Disparate Treatment
The courts have developed three distinct theories of liability in
their application of Title VII: individual disparate treatment,
systemic disparate treatment, and disparate impact.86  In an
individual disparate treatment case, the issue is whether the
employer treated the individual plaintiff less favorably because of
her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. s7 The Supreme
Court set out a three-step model for proving individual disparate
treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green"8 and then refined
that model in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.8 9
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by eliminating the most common reasons for ajob applicant to be
rejected-namely, that she did not apply, she was not qualified, or
the position was not open 0 Once this is established, the infer-
ence is that, unless the employer can come forward with another
plausible reason, discrimination must have been the cause of the
decision.9 Second, the burden of production shifts to the employ-
er to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the deci-
sion.9" And third, if the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff
must show that the employer's stated reason for its decision was a
10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (focusing on curtailing discrimination among
government contractors). State laws proscribing discrimination often were either
nonexistent, especially in those states where discrimination was most severe, or poorly
enforced. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 23-24 (2d ed. 1988).
8 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 84, at 23-24. Title VII applies to all private
employers with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
" See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual
disparate treatment); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335-36 n.15 (1977) (systemic disparate treatment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (disparate impact); see also Zimmer et al., supra note 84, at 40.
a See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
89 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
' See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (holding that plaintiffestablishes a prima
facie case by showing that she belonged to a protected class, that she applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, that she was
rejected despite her qualifications, and that the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications after she was
rejected).
91 See id.
92 See id.
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"pretext" for discrimination." Because it will generally be easy for
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case," and because the
employer will usually be able to articulate some legitimate reason
for its decision, most individual disparate treatment cases will
depend on the plaintiffs ability to prove that the employer's reason
was a pretext.95  Because the plaintiff carries the burden of
persuasion at all times,9 6 the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of
proving that the employer's proffered reason for rejecting her was
not the "real" reason.
97
95 Id. at 804. But see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993)
(holding that rejection of employer's proffered reason will not necessarily lead to
judgment for the plaintiff).
I See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir.
1992) ("Because the prima facie case is easily made out, it is rarely the focus of the
ultimate disagreement."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
" See Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Because of the
employee's easy burden of establishing a prima facie case and the employer's normal
ability to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, most
disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that the
nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination.").
9' See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.").
" Since human decisions are rarely the result of only one motive, what happens
when it appears that discrimination was one of many reasons for the employer's
decision? The Supreme Court first addressed these "mixed motives" cases in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). A sharply divided Court held that a
plaintiff successfully carries her burden if she shows that a prohibited factor, such as
gender, "was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made." Id. at
241 (first emphasis added). The employer could avoid liability, however, by showing
that the same decision would have been made even if it had not considered the
prohibited factor. See id. at 242.
Price Waterhouse also represented the first in-depth discussion by the Supreme
Court of the legal relevance of sex stereotyping. The Court clearly stated that an
employer's differential treatment of men and women based on sex stereotypes
constitutes sex discrimination:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.'" An employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places
women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of ajob if they
behave aggressively and out of ajob if they do not. Title VII lifts women
out of this bind.
Id. at 251 (citation omitted) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
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3. Systemic Disparate Treatment
In a systemic disparate treatment case, the ultimate issue is still
whether the employer intentionally discriminated, but the plaintiff
is a group instead of an individual. Usually brought as a class action
or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on
behalf of a group of employees, a systemic disparate treatment case
attempts to demonstrate either an explicit policy of treating
members of one group differently or a "pattern or practice" of
doing so." Plaintiffs establish a prima facie case by using statisti-
cal evidence to show a disparity between the percentage of class
members in the pool of qualified applicants and the percentage of
class members in the workforce.9 9  Once the plaintiffs have
established the prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of
production to articulate a different explanation for the statistical
disparity.'0 ° Thus, the empirical assumption underlying systemic
disparate treatment is that without another explanation, the
percentage of class members in the workforce would be equal to the
percentage of class members in the applicant pool. A statistical
imbalance is not in itself a violation, but constitutes evidence that
can aid in proving that the employer is discriminating.'
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), altered the disparate treatment theory of employment
discrimination law somewhat. It codified Price Waterhouse's notion of mixed motives,
providing that it is unlawful for one of the prohibited factors to be "a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). It also modified Price Waterhouse,
in that proof of an illegitimate motivating factor actually establishes a violation
instead of merely shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. See id. If the
defendant demonstrates that the same decision would have been made even without
the unlawful motivating factor, however, the remedy available to the plaintiff will be
limited so that she cannot receive a monetary award or reinstatement. See § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B)(ii). Presumably attorney's fees would still be available. See § 2000e-5(k).
" See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334
(1977) (examining whether petitioner company engaged in a "pattern or practice" of
employment discrimination).
" See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
'o See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
101 As the Teamsters Court noted:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as
this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population
in the community from which employees are hired.
Id. at 340 n.20.
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4. Disparate Impact
The issue in a disparate impact case is whether an employment
practice that is neutral on its face impacts one group more
negatively than another. Two Supreme Court cases, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.'1 2 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' established a
three-step process for determining liability. First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that the
challenged practice, although facially neutral, affects one group
more harshly than another.1"4 This is usually accomplished by
using statistics to show that the seemingly neutral practice, when
applied over time to large numbers of people, affects a protected
class more harshly than an unprotected class.10 5 Second, once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer has the burden
of proving that, despite its negative impact on a protected class, the
practice in question was justified by business necessity.' Third,
even if the employer shows business necessity, the plaintiff can show
that the employer is using the practice as a pretext for discrimina-
tion by pointing to another practice that would serve the same
purpose without a discriminatory impact.0 7
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
o 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
104 See id. at 425.
... See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (noting that "to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral
employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact"); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (holding that a prima facie case was established
when plaintiffs proved that minimum height and weight requirements disproportion-
ately affected women applying for positions as correctional officers).
'06 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.").
1
1 SeeAlbemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Two Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980s
made substantial changes to disparate impact analysis: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989). Watson was the first case in which the Court specifically held that disparate
impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices. See 487 U.S. at
991. In Wards Cove, on the other hand, the Court significantly weakened disparate
impact liability. In dictum, the Wards Cove Court eased the employer's burden by
redefining business necessity to require only a reasonablejustification instead of strict
necessity: "The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice.... [T]here is no requirement that
the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for
it to pass muster .... " 490 U.S. at 659. Wards Cove also changed the prior
assumption that business necessity was an affirmative defense for the employer by
placing the burden of persuasion in showing a lack of business necessity on the plain-
tiff. Thus, "the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
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5. The Shortcomings of the Three Theories of Employment
Discrimination Liability in the Context of
Upper-Level Cases
The three traditional theories of employment discrimination
liability, as they are frequently applied, do not adequately address
most cases involving upper-level jobs. In systemic disparate
treatment cases, courts often refuse to infer discrimination solely
from a pattern of exclusion demonstrated by statistics, and instead
insist on anecdotal evidence of discriminatory motive.10 8  This
evidence is frequently either unavailable or available only indirectly
through expert witness testimony. Furthermore, these same courts
often discount the value of expert testimony in establishing patterns
of bias within the workplace." 9 In addition, despite the Supreme
Court's pronouncements that unintentional behavior such as
stereotyping is legally relevant,"0 the plaintiff in an individual
disparate treatment case still must persuade the court that "the
employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.""'
Another difficulty that upper-level plaintiffs face in attempting
to bring individual disparate treatment cases stems from the
Supreme Court's recent decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks."2  In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff will not
necessarily prevail even if she proves that the employer's articulated
justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however,
remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff." Id.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified disparate impact theory by overruling
much of Wards Cove. For the first time, Congress explicitly codified the concept of
disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1). The Act rejected the Wards Cove
dictum that gave the plaintiff the burden of showing a lack of business necessity.
Now, the employer has the burden of persuading the court that the challenged prac-
tice was job related and consistent with business necessity. See § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
The Act did not, however, clarify the definition of business necessity.
" See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 311 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
plaintiff's failure to come forward with anecdotal evidence of discriminatory
employment practices); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1793 (1990) (notingjudges' insistence that
plaintiffs present anecdotal evidence of discrimination to refute the lack of interest
argument). But see Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(noting that discriminatory intent may be inferred from statistical evidence).
109 See e.g., Sears, 839 F.2d at 321 (stating reasons for finding plaintiff's expert
witness testimony unpersuasive).11 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
111 1d.
112 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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reason was not the real reason for the decision. Once the employer
articulates an explanation for its decision, the Court reasoned, it has
met its burden of production, and the McDonnell Douglas framework
of presumptions drops out.1 The Court can then require more
direct evidence that the real reason for the employer's decision was
discrimination." 4 This kind of direct evidence will be especially
difficult for upper-level plaintiffs to produce, given the subtle
factors at work in many high-level employment decisions.
Furthermore, the individual disparate treatment model's focus
on the individual plaintiff often obscures the important group
dynamics of the workplace, and thus fails to detect the forms of sex
discrimination most pervasive in high-leveljobs. The district court
in Ezold compensated for this shortcoming of the individual
disparate treatment approach by trying to place the facts of Ezold's
individual case in the broader context of the entire work environ-
ment. It did not treat the partnership decision in a vacuum, but
rather took into account Ezold's admonishment for being too
involved in "women's issues," the criticism she received for
displaying stereotypically male personality traits, and the firm's weak
policy on sexual harassment." 5 The court of appeals, however,
rejected the district court's analysis, and was unpersuaded that these
broader workplace dynamics might indicate that the firm's proffered
explanations could be a pretext for discrimination.1
6
Systemic disparate treatment also poses formidable challenges
for upper-level plaintiffs. Institutions have a limited number of
upper-level jobs, and few candidates will have the qualifications to
contend for them. The small number of both opportunities and
applicants thus makes accurate statistical analysis virtually impossi-
ble. Courts, recognizing this fundamental principle of statistics,
have frequently warned plaintiffs that statistical evidence will not
carry much weight if the sample size is too small."
7
"s See id. at 2747 (noting that under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's discrimination claim only shifts
the burden of production to the employer, while the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff).
11 See id. at 2749 (holding that plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to prove
that discrimination was the real reason for employer's decision).
1 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1192 (E.D. Pa.
1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
16 See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 543-45 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
'7 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
n.20 (1977) (noting that small sample size may detract from trustworthiness of statisti-
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Unfortunately, the disparate impact theory of liability may not
be an option either. First, like systemic disparate treatment,
disparate impact theory's dependence on statistical evidence will be
problematic for upper-level plaintiffs because of the small numbers
of people involved in upper-level jobs. Second, disparate impact
theory is intended to be applied to facially neutral practices that
affect one group more harshly than another.118 With upper-level
discrimination cases, however, the claim is that the practices are not
truly facially neutral. Although the criteria according to which
upper-level applicants are judged may appear neutral to those who
apply them, the test used for women differs from the test used for
their male colleagues. When this test consists of an unstructured set
of highly subjective judgments, however, it is difficult to prove that
the test applied to one group was different than the test applied to
another. Third, because courts assume that subjective decision-
making is appropriate for upper-level jobs, they tend to accept
vague subjective systems without question." 9 They frequently fail
to recognize that legitimate subjective systems can be distinguished
from arbitrary subjective systems. Finally, courts that interpret the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to allow the lenient standard of business
necessity articulated by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove' 20 will
be more likely to permit employers to continue using discriminatory
cal evidence); Mayor of Phila. v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621
(1974) (validating the district court's concern for the small size of the statistical
sample); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Teamsters
and Educational Equality League); Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 741 F.2d
975, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that small sample size prevented statistics "from
giving rise to a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive").
"
8 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"9 See, e.g., Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1978)
(examining a layoff system which included consideration of an employee's "attitude,
experience, educational level and position"); Frausto v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 563 F.2d
1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that "a poor interview, an unstable employment
history, a poor reputation in the legal community, and the inability to get along with
people" were valid and nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring appellant); EEOC
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 445 F. Supp. 223, 254-55 (D. Del. 1978) (holding,
inter alia, that subjective evaluations reported by mainly white supervisory staff, which
affected promotions of employees, were insufficient evidence of discrimination); see
also Bartholet, supra note 4, at 976-77 (describing the more lenient standard applied
to upper-level jobs).
121 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1429 (10th Cir. 1993)
(using the Wards Cove standard of business necessity and stating that "[t]he law on this
matter is clearly established"). For a discussion of the apparent weakening of the
business necessity standard in Wards Cove and the failure of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to clarify the issue, see supra note 107.
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subjective employment criteria for upper-level jobs.
B. The Courts Apply a Lower Level of Scrutiny to
Upper-Level Employment Decisions
1. The Courts' Response to Subjective Decision-Making Systems
When lower-level jobs are at stake, most circuit courts do not
hesitate to point out that subjective employment criteria are suscep-
tible to abuse because of the large amount of discretion they confer
on the decision-maker. In fact, no matter what kind of job is at
stake, the courts of appeals for nine federal circuits have specifically
called for a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny when an
employer has utilized subjective criteria in its hiring and promotion
decisions.
12 1
121 See e.g., Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988)
("[T]his circuit has cautioned 'that subjective practices are particularly susceptible to
discriminatory abuse and should be closely scrutinized.'" (quoting Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
989 (1988))); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867,871 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[S]ubjective
evaluations ... provide a ready mechanism for ... discrimination."); Grano v.
Department of Dev., 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("[S]ubjective
evaluation processes intended to recognize merit provide ready mechanisms for dis-
crimination.... [T]he legitimacy of the articulated reason for the employment deci-
sion is subject to particularly close scrutiny where the evaluation is subjective and the
evaluators themselves are not members of the protected minority."); Royal v. Missouri
Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 655 F.2d 159, 164 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[S]ubjective promo-
tion procedures are to be closely scrutinized because of their susceptibility to
discriminatory abuse.... When the evaluation is in any degree subjective and when
the evaluators ... are not members of the protected minority, the legitimacy ... of
the articulated reason for the decision should be subject to particularly close scrutiny
.... "); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("'[C]ourts [must] be
sensitive to possible bias in the hiring and promotion process arising from ... sub-
jective definition[s] of employment criteria.' Appellee's promotion procedures...
must be closely scrutinized because of their capacity for masking unlawful bias." (quo-
ting Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423
U.S. 809 (1975))); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445,450 (7th Cir. 1976)
("While some subjectivity is inevitable in filling jobs of an executive character, the
total lack of objective standards... could only reinforce the prejudices, unconscious
or not, which Congress in Title VII sought to eradicate as a basis for employment."),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 550 (4th
Cir. 1975) ("Nonobjective hiring standards are always suspect because of their
capacity for masking racial basis [sic]."); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d
923, 928 (10th Cir.) ("[Personal and subjective criteria encourage and foster discrimi-
nation."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[P]romotion/transfer procedures which depend almost
entirely upon.., subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation... are a ready
mechanism for discrimination.., much of which can be covertly concealed .... ").
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This concern about subjective employment decisions, however,
seems to have a consistent impact only in cases in which lower-level
jobs are at stake. In such cases, when there is evidence that the
employment decision was based on highly subjective judgments,
there seems to be a presumption that the subjective decision-making
process was used to mask unlawful discrimination or was not job-
related. 122 With upper-level jobs, the courts seem to presume that
the decision was not discriminatory, despite their professed concern
for subjective evaluations. In these cases the courts still insist that
the plaintiff prove that the subjective criteria were used by the
defendant to disguise unlawful discrimination. 123 In some circuits
the courts ignore the dangers of subjective evaluations altogether.
Instead of a higher-than-usual level of scrutiny, these courts apply
a lower-than-usual level of scrutiny when confronted with subjective
decisions about upper-level jobs.
124
Why do courts react so differently to subjective decision-making
systems used to fill lower-level jobs than they do to subjective
decision-making systems used at higher levels?125 One explanation
may be the presumption that subjective decision-making systems are
necessary for high-level jobs but not for low-level jobs, for which the
availability of quantitative, objective alternatives makes the use of
subjective systems seem suspicious. The availability of an objective
system also makes the court's decision to strike down the subjective
system more palatable.
With upper-level jobs, on the other hand, some courts assume
that completely subjective decision-making systems are the only
12 See, e.g.,Jauregui, 852 F.2d at 1135-36; Miles, 750 F.2d at 871; Royal, 655 F.2d
at 164; Stewart, 542 F.2d at 450-51; Barnett, 518 F.2d at 549-50; Muller, 509 F.2d at
928; Rowe, 457 F.2d at 359; see also Bartholet, supra note 4, at 975.
1 See, e.g., Grano, 699 F.2d at 837 ("The ultimate issue.., is whether the subjec-
tive criteria were used to disguise discriminatory action.").
124 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir.
1992) ("We have cautioned courts on several occasions to avoid unnecessary intrusion
into subjective promotion decisions .... ."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 28 (1993); Kunda
v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532,548 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Determinations about such
matters as teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature are
subjective, and unless they can be shown to have been used as the mechanism to
obscure discrimination, they must be left for evaluation by the professionals .... ").
1 The differences in the ways courts treat upper-level and lower-level discrimina-
tion cases are not limited to the way they react to evidence of overly subjective
decision-making processes. There seems to be a general reluctance by the courts to
scrutinize upper-level employment decisions. See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 979-80
(describing judges' tendency to identify with upper-level employers); Rhode, supra
note 3, at 1194 (noting judges' sympathy for employers).
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feasible option.126 They do not explore the possibility that subjec-
tivity is a matter of degree. They fear that holding in favor of the
plaintiff would either force them to take the subjective decision out
of the employer's hands and give it to the court, or disallow the
employer from using any subjectivity at all. These courts act as if
the absence of an objective decision-making option for upper-level
jobs requires them to accept whatever subjective system the
employer has chosen. Thus, the Ezold court noted "our society's
commitment to free decision-making by the private sector in
economic affairs" in order to justify "the difficult task a plaintiff
faces in proving discrimination in the application of subjective
factors."' 2' Rather than recognizing ways in which Wolf, Block
could make its evaluation system more structured and less suscepti-
ble to bias, the court simply noted the dilemma that subjective
systems represent for plaintiffs and preserved the employer's
discretion.
At first glance it would seem that some of the recent develop-
ments in employment discrimination law could effectively address
many of the perceived deficiencies in the law's treatment of upper-
level cases. Bartholet's main concern was that the Griggs type of
disparate impact liability,'28 which requires the employer to
demonstrate the business necessity of a system that impacts more
harshly on class members than non-class members, was not being
applied to upper-level jobs, which typically entail subjective
judgments on the part of the employer. 29 In 1988, the Supreme
Court seemed to respond by holding in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust that disparate impact analysis can be applied to subjective
employment criteria."' Pamela Perry objected to the Court's
apparent abandonment of the business necessity standard in Wards
Cove."' Yet the Civil Rights Act of 1991 seemed to address that
"2 For example, the court of appeals in Ezold noted that the firm's decision-
making system was subjective in order tojustify its deferential approach. See 983 F.2d
at 527. The court did not attempt to determine whether the firm's system was more
subjective than necessary, which would increase the likelihood that unconscious biases
played a role. Instead, the Ezold court determined that all subjective promotion
decisions should receive minimal judicial scrutiny. See id.
127 Id.
12
1 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra part II.A.4
(discussing the disparate impact theory of liability).126 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 955-59.
0 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
1 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989); Pamela L. Perry,
Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate Discretion: The
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problem at least partially by placing the burden of persuasion back
on the employer to show that the challenged practice is both job
related and a business necessity.- 2 Mary Radford suggested that, in
a mixed motives case, 33 proof of an employer's use of an illegiti-
mate motivating factor in an employment decision should itself
establish a Title VII violation, instead of merely shifting the burden
of proving causation to the defendant, 4 an approach that the
Supreme Court adopted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.135 Again,
however, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 adopted Radford's suggestion
by declaring that in mixed motives cases, a plaintiff can establish
unlawful discrimination by demonstrating that a prohibited criterion
was a motivating factor for the employer.
136
2. Challenges Faced by Upper-Level Plaintiffs
With these recent developments in employment discrimination
law that seem to help upper-level plaintiffs, why does Title VII
continue to fall short of providing an adequate remedy for discrimi-
nation against women in high-level jobs? One answer may be that
disparate impact analysis, which would seem to provide the
appropriate analysis for unconsciously discriminatory employment
practices,137 is not really available. Disparate impact theory
focuses on whether a facially neutral policy impacts female employ-
ees more adversely than male employees. The plaintiff must use
statistics to show that there is a nontrivial disparity in the way the
challenged policy affects women compared to men.' 38 In upper-
Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under Title VII, 12 INDUS.
REL. LJ. 1, 2-7 (1990).
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Note that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did
not clarify the definition of "business necessity." Thus, the weakened definition
suggested by Wards Cove dicta may still be of some relevance. See 490 U.S. at 659; see
also supra note 107.
3 For a brief discussion of mixed motives cases, see supra note 97.
"s4 See Radford, supra note 31, at 529.
135 490 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1989).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
" As Bartholet points out, in a disparate treatment case, the employer need only
articulate a rational explanation for its employment decision. Then the plaintiff
assumes the burden of proving that the explanation was a pretext. In a disparate
impact case, on the other hand, the employer must show that business necessity
demands that the current system be maintained. "Rational explanations abound for
why blacks are assigned to less desirable jobs or receive lower salaries. Proof that
business necessity demands that they be treated this way is a different matter."
Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1004.
"' The EEOC uses the "four-fifths rule." The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
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level employment, however, decisions are typically made on an
individualized basis,8 9 making it difficult for the plaintiff to have
a large enough sample size to make an adequate statistical show-
ing.14 There is also a widespread perception that subjective
criteria, which play a significant role in upper-level hiring decisions,
cannot be validated. 4 ' Thus, the court will not expect the em-
ployer to show business necessity by validating its subjective
system.14 2 Furthermore, plaintiffs may feel obligated to rely on
disparate treatment theory rather than disparate impact theory
because they do not have enough information. Plaintiffs will not
feel comfortable claiming that a particular practice used by the
employer has a disparate impact when often they do not know at
the outset precisely what practices the employer uses. 143 This is
Selection state that "[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest
rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1993).
1s9 See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1193 n.162 (noting that "decisionmaking is
individualized" in upper-level employment).
140 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
141 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 980 (1988) (noting that
validation techniques endorsed by the EEOC often cannot be used with subjective
selection systems); Frazier v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 851 F.2d 1447, 1455 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("some components of a selection device may be so subjective that ...
validation will be impossible"); Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 217 (5th Cir.
1985) (noting that subjective criteria are virtually impossible to validate formally), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986); United States v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 775 F. Supp.
1450, 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (stating that subjective promotion guidelines are
"difficult, if not impossible to validate").
Validation is a technique for correlating successful performance on the
employer's selection criteria with successful performance on the job at issue. The
EEOC guidelines provide a detailed explanation of accepted validation techniques
that employers may use to justify their application of selection criteria that have an
adverse impact on a protected class. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1993).
... See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 987. Bartholet notes that
courts in upper level cases often seem to assume that subjective systems are
inherently incapable of being validated. This assumption is implicit in many
of the cases upholding such systems on the ground that some kind ofsubjec-
tive system clearly seems appropriate, without further inquiry into whether
the system at issue is valid.
Id.
" Bartholet notes:
This initial plaintiff strategy may be sensible when the employment scheme
at issue is obscure and all that is clear is that it results in differential treat-
ment-as is often the case in upper level employment. Plaintiffs cannot
always know, when they first file suit, how defendants will eventually
describe their employment policies; it is not possible for plaintiffs to show
that unknown policies have a disparate impact.
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more likely to be a problem for upper-level jobs with subjective,
undefined evaluation criteria.
Because of these difficulties with the current structure of
disparate impact liability, most upper-level employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs will use the disparate treatment theory of liability. In
addition, because most upper-level cases will not involve large
enough numbers for an adequate statistical showing, 144 most upper-
level plaintiffs will rely on individual, as opposed to systemic,
disparate treatment theory. Unfortunately, individual disparate
treatment will also be problematic for upper-level plaintiffs because
of its emphasis on intent.145 In individual disparate treatment
cases, the ultimate issue will usually be whether the employer's
stated reason for not hiring or promoting the plaintiff is a pretext
for a discriminatory reason (pretext cases) or whether a
discriminatory factor was part of the reason for the employer's
decision (mixed motives cases). Ostensibly, the plaintiff will not
need direct evidence that discriminatory intent was involved. As
Justice Powell explained in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,146 the plaintiff has the "ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."
147
In practice, however, upper-level plaintiffs often will need to
have direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory motives.
When faced with the prospect of second-guessing another pro-
fessional's subjective opinion of the skills and abilities of the
plaintiff, some judges feel uncomfortable. They may presume that
the expert's opinion was correct and not influenced by illegitimate
factors. Without strong, almost "smoking gun" evidence, many
courts simply defer to the employer's judgment. For example, as
Chief Judge Dolores Sloviter recently stated in a case involving aca-
demic tenure, "I do not believe that it is proper or desirable for the
courts of this circuit to become involved in substantive tenure and
promotion decisions in the academic setting unless the evidence of
Id. at 1006.
'"See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
146 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
147 Id. at 256.
1994] KEEPING WOMEN OUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SUITE 297
discriminatory action is unmistakable." 148 The court of appeals in
Ezold took a similar posture. While noting early in the opinion that
the plaintiff was required to prove that the employer's proffered
justification was a pretext for discrimination "by a preponderance
of the evidence," 149 the court later noted that the pretext must be
"obvious or manifest" when subjective factors are involved. 5 '
Unfortunately, "unmistakable" evidence of discrimination will be
nearly impossible to obtain. As discussed above, many of the factors
that make a woman's experiences in the office different from a
man's are the unconscious and unintentional effects of homosocial
reproduction, stereotypes, tokenism, and the like. 151  Direct
evidence of these problems is difficult to find. Not only might the
perpetrators not be acting with the conscious intent to impede
women's progress, they are often not aware that they are perpetra-
tors at all. Charles Lawrence describes the way this phenomenon
operates with regard to unconscious racism,"5 2 but his analysis
applies equally well to unconscious sexism. "[T]acitly transmitted
cultural stereotype[s]"' about men and women operate over a
lifetime and teach us about the proper roles of the sexes. But
because the lessons are not taught explicitly, we are unaware of
their effect on us:
[A]n individual may select a white job applicant over an equally
qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was based on
observed intangibles unrelated to race. The employer perceives
the white candidate as "more articulate," "more collegial," "more
thoughtful," or "more charismatic." He is unaware of the learned
stereotype that influenced his decision. Moreover, he has
probably also learned an explicit lesson of which he is very much
aware: Good, law-abiding people do notjudge others on the basis
148 Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 181 (3d Cir. 1991) (Sloviter, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992);
see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992)
("These cautions against 'unwarranted invasion or intrusion' into matters involving
professional judgments about an employee's qualifications for promotion within a
profession inform the remainder of our analysis."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993);
Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is clear that
courts must be vigilant not to intrude into that determination, and should not
substitute theirjudgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications of
faculty members for promotion and tenure.").
149 983 F.2d at 522.
10 Id. at 534.
. See supra parts I.A.1, I.A.3, & I.A.6.
152 See Lawrence, supra note 68, at 328-44.
153 Id. at 343.
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of race. Even the most thorough investigation of conscious motive
will not uncover the race-based stereotype that has influenced his
decision.
1 54
Furthermore, the actors who evaluate personnel in high-level jobs
may be more sophisticated about their legal responsibilities and thus
more careful to avoid making any incriminating comments.
Although some plaintiffs may catch their employer making state-
ments that clearly reveal a gender-influenced decision,155 these will
probably be rare occurrences.
3. The Promise of Price Waterhouse
An examination of recent employment discrimination cases
dealing with subjective decision-making processes reveals the courts'
ambivalence in this area of the law. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,5 ' the Supreme Court eloquently discussed the legal
relevance of sex stereotyping in proving a disparate treatment
case. 57 The Court seemed to be moving closer to an understand-
ing of the subtle barriers that often keep women out of the most
prestigious jobs. Ann Hopkins did not have to prove directly that
Price Waterhouse's decision to deny her partnership was consciously
motivated by gender. Instead, the Court held that the prevalence
of sex stereotyping in the workplace made it more likely than not
that "the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she
is a woman."
58
Because the behavior at issue in Price Waterhouse was particularly
egregious, the case was not as big a victory for upper-level plaintiffs
as it appeared to be. Although the Court acknowledged that
unconscious sex stereotypes can have a real effect on employment
decisions, the stereotypes at work in that case were not particularly
154 id.
155 Ann Hopkins was one such lucky plaintiff. Despite the fact that she was
responsible for securing more contracts for Price Waterhouse than any other partner-
ship candidate and that one project in particular had been carried out "virtually at the
partner level," Ann Hopkins was denied partnership. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989). Fortunately, Hopkins had clear evidence that her gender
influenced the decision. Several partners complained about her use of profanity, one
partner suggested that she take "a course at charm school," and another called her
.macho." Perhaps the most damaging evidence came from the man who told her that
to improve her chances she should "walk more femininely.... wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. at 235.
156 490 U.S. 228.
157 See id. at 250-51.
'- Id. at 258.
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subtle.' 59 When Ann Hopkins was told that to improve her
chances for partnership she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry," 160 she was being held to an overtly
different standard than her male colleagues. Furthermore, the main
evidence in the case-sex stereotyping-is not as controversial as
most of the other social and psychological phenomena outlined in
Part I of this Comment.
6 1
4. The Reality of Ezold
Nancy Ezold's recent suit against the Philadelphia law firm Wolf,
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen is probably a more typical example
of a modern, upper-level employment discrimination case. Unlike
Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ezold was not a
superstar'who clearly outshone the male candidates for partner.
There was, however, a significant amount of evidence that she had
been treated differently than male candidates. 162 The process by
which partners evaluated associates under partnership consideration
was extremely subjective, with all partners, no matter how familiar
they were with the associate's work, evaluating each candidate "on
the basis of what [they] expect[ed] of an Associate at th[e] Asso-
ciate's level of experience." 16 The district court noted evidence
that stereotyping had influenced the firm's decision:
The plaintiff was criticized for being "very demanding" and was
expected by some members of the Firm to be nonassertive and
acquiescent to the predominately male partnership. Her failure to
accept this role was a factor which resulted in her not being
promoted to partner. However several male associates who had
been evaluated negatively for lacking sufficient assertiveness in
their demeanor were made partners.
64
... See supra note 155.
160 490 U.S. at 235.
161 For example, in a recent survey of Fortune 1000 CEOs, of the 80% of the
respondents who acknowledged the existence of barriers keeping women from top
positions, 81% (or about 65% of all respondents) named "stereotyping" and "precon-
ceptions" as the most important problems. See Fierman, supra note 13, at 42.
162 See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1183, 1191-
92 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
... Id. at 1180; see also Radford, supra note 31, at 488 n.65 ("Studies indicate that
the possibility of bias based on stereotypical notions increases when no information
or only ambiguous information is available as to the actual performance of an
employee.").
"' Ezold, 751 F. Supp. at 1189 (emphasis omitted).
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The partner in charge of assignments told Ms. Ezold when she was
hired that "it would not be easy for her at Wolf, Block because she
did not fit the Wolf, Block mold since she was [among other things]
a woman."16 5 When Ezold brought the treatment of paralegals to
the firm's attention, she was criticized for being too concerned with
women's issues. A male attorney did not receive the same criticism
when he brought up the issue of part-time attorneys, even though
he recognized it as a women's issue."6 Furthermore, the firm had
a weak sexual harassment policy, evidenced by the fact that
allegations of sexual harassment against a male associate were
considered so insignificant that they were not even brought to the
attention of the members of the Associates Committee when they
were considering him for partnership. 6 Finally, one partner
admitted that the inferior quality of the cases assigned to Ezold put
her in an impossible situation: the chairman of the department
would not assign her to complex cases, yet at evaluation time she
was criticized because she had not worked on complex cases.
168
The district court concluded:
The defendant promoted to partnership men having evaluations
substantially the same or inferior to the plaintiffs, and indeed
promoted male associates who the defendant claimed had precisely
the lack of analytical or writing ability upon which Wolf, Block
purportedly based its decision concerning the plaintiff... Such
differential treatment establishes that the defendant's reasons were
a pretext for discrimination.'
69
Despite the substantial amount of evidence in Ezold's favor, the
court of appeals reversed the decision, concluding that "there is no
evidence of sex discrimination here." 170  Although the court
denied that it was insulating the firm's subjective judgments from
judicial review,' 7 ' it seemed to be doing exactly that. It ignored
the traditional fact-finding function of the district court by using
evaluations from all of the partners instead of limiting its analysis
to only those evaluations from partners whom the district court had
'" Id. at 1177.
166 See id. at 1188.
167 See id.
16' See id. at 1178-79.
169 Id. at 1191-92.
1 0 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 547 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
171 See id. at 527 ("[S]ubjective promotion decisions . . . are not insulated from
judicial review for unlawful discrimination.").
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found to be without gender bias.'72 It admitted lowering its level
of scrutiny because the decision involved was a subjective promotion
decision for an upper-level job. 7 s The court justified all of this by
pointing to the fact that courts should defer to the subjective
decisions of employers:
Were the factors Wolf considered in deciding which associates
should be admitted to the partnership objective, as opposed to
subjective, the conflicts in various partners' views about Ezold's
legal analytical ability that this record shows might amount to no
more than a conflict in the evidence that the district court as
factfinder had full power to resolve. 174
'Thus, according to the Third Circuit the district court is only
allowed to scrutinize employment decisions that are based on
objective criteria. Whereas the employer in Watson unsuccessfully
tried to argue that subjective employment decisions should be
immune from disparate impact scrutiny,'75 the Ezold court seemed
to go even further by immunizing Wolf, Block from disparate
treatment scrutiny.'
76
5. Why the Lower Level of Scrutiny?
Why do some courts shy away from scrutinizing upper-level
employment decisions? One explanation may be that judges
identify with the decision-makers involved:
Judges defer to the employers with whom they identify, and they
uphold the kinds of selection systems from which they have
benefited. When they deal with prestigious jobs, the courts show
an appreciation of the apparent rationality of the employment
procedures at issue and a respect for the decisionmakers involved
that can only be explained by the fact that these cases confront the
courts with their own world. Judges have a personal investment
in traditional selection procedures on the upper level.'77
12 See id. at 532 n.22.
"73 See id. at 527.
174 Id. at 529.
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-90 (1988).
I76 See Brief of Amici Curiae Fifty-Five Organizations in Support of the Petitioner
at 9, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992) (No.
92-2013), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
1 Bartholet, supra note 4, at 979. In one case concerning academic tenure, the
court admitted its sympathy for the employer:
Of a hypothetical twenty equally brilliant law school graduates in a law
office, one is selected to become a partner. Extensive discovery would
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Another reason for this hands-off approach is the perceived
importance of the jobs at stake. Courts appear to believe that
lower-level jobs are fungible, involving tasks that many people could
perform, whereas upper-level jobs are more important and difficult
to perform. Thus, the disruption involved in striking down a
discriminatory employment system is not as worrisome when only
lower-level jobs will be affected.
17 8
The courts may also feel that their lack of expertise concerning
many upper-level professions disqualifies them from scrutinizing
employment decisions. 17  As the Third Circuit warned in an
academic tenure case, "[d]eterminations about such matters as
teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature ...
must be left for evaluation by the professionals, particularly since
they often involve inquiry into aspects of arcane scholarship beyond
the competence of individual judges."
180
There may also be a concern that scrutinizing upper-level
employment decisions will inevitably take too much discretion away
from employers. In Ezold, for example, the district court was
skeptical of Wolf, Block's requirement that associates demonstrate
the ability to handle complex litigation on their own.1 8' In its
reversal, the court of appeals scolded the lower court for question-
ing the firm's partnership standards instead of merely how those
standards were applied. 8 2
Another explanation may be that the courts are reluctant to
scrutinize upper-level employment systems, which are usually based
reveal that the other nineteen were almost equally well qualified. Fifty
junior bank officers all aspire to become a vice-president-one is selected.
And, of course, even judges are plagued by the difficulty of decision in
selecting law clerks out of the many equally well qualified.
Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974).
1'7 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 956-57. Bartholet notes that:
Courts may have felt fairly comfortable with the more radical implications
of Griggs for lower-level jobs because there jobs did not seem particularly
important. On the upper level, however, where courts feel that the quality
of performance really matters, they may be reluctant to interfere with
traditional selection methods.
Id. at 957.
'79 See id. at 979.
0 Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980).
'8' See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1188 (E.D.
Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
182 See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527-28 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
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on subjective criteria, because they fear that there are no alternative
objective systems with which to replace them.' This fear is
especially apparent in disparate impact cases. With lower-level
cases, like Griggs, the employer can avoid being forced into a quota
system by simply adopting a job-related objective system that does
not have an adverse impact on a protected group. 8 4 But with
upper-level cases, in which subjectivity is often required, some fear
that a court decision striking down an employer's subjective system
would force the employer to adopt quotas.'85
Finally, the courts may apply a lower level of scrutiny to upper-
level cases because those cases are normally brought as individual
disparate treatment cases.'85 It is relatively easy to argue that
subtle, unconscious differences in the way an employer treats men
and women are having a real effect when one can look at large
numbers and point to a resulting statistical disparity. Disparate
impact plaintiffs and systemic disparate treatment plaintiffs both
benefit from this kind of evidence. When the plaintiff can show
that a pattern has developed, the employer's explanations are less
likely to be believed. Thus, when the employer in Stender v. Lucky
Stores, Inc.'8" explained that the disparity between the number of
men and women in certain positions in its stores was a result of
women's lack of interest in those positions, the court was skepti-
cal.' When looking at an isolated case, on the other hand, the
employer's explanation may seem to make perfect sense. Thus,
Wolf, Block's declaration that the reason for Nancy Ezold's failure
to be promoted to partnership was her lack of legal analytical ability
was not particularly suspicious.' 8 9 If Wolf, Block had tried to use
an explanation like this in the face of a large number of seemingly
qualified women being denied partnership at a much higher rate of
185 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
's See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (prohibiting the use
of testing that has a disparate impact on a protected group and does not provide a
measure ofjob performance).
"8 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), for example, the
defendant worried that the only way to avoid liability under a disparate impact theory
of liability would be to adopt numerical quotas. See id. at 989.
" See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
17 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
" See id. at 326. But see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 322 (7th
Cir. 1988) (accepting Sears's contention that the disparity between the number of
men and women in commission sales positions was the result of women's lack of
interest in those positions).
lag See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 517-18.
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frequency than men, which is the typical scenario in a pattern or
practice case, the court might not have been quite so amenable.
C. Why a Lower Level of Scrutiny for Upper-Level
Employment Decisions Is Inadequate
As discussed in Part I, the highly subjective nature of most
upper-level employment decisions makes them even more suscepti-
ble to unconscious biases than lower-level employment deci-
sions.9 0 Thus, when choosing the best widget assembler, an
employer will probably rely on the objective qualification of widgets
assembled per minute and never have the opportunity to let
unconscious biases affect the employment decision. When choosing
partners in a law firm or granting tenure in a university, however,
it will be much easier for an employer to let unintentional stereo-
types cloud the decision.
191
If this unconscious sexism affected only employers, the courts'
tendency to examine upper-level employment decisions with less
scrutiny than lower-level employment decisions would not be quite
so problematic. But unconscious sexism infects the rest of society
as well. Lawrence's discussion of the universality of racism in our
society probably could be applied to sexism as well:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because
of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race
and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To
the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us,
we are all racists.1
9 2
Similarly, the perceptions ofjudges and jury members are likely to
be at least somewhat influenced by unconscious sexism. There is no
reason to think that women will be infected with unconscious sexism
to a significantly less extent than men. As one legal scholar has
noted, "both men and women have been imbued with the notion
190 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
191 It is not surprising that Charles Lawrence, when discussing the role that
unconscious racism can play in an employment decision, uses upper-level jobs and
subjective decision-making criteria in his examples. The jobs he picks for his
hypothetical situations are doctor and lawyer. The criteria his hypothetical employers
use are "articulate," "collegial," "thoughtful," and "charismatic." Lawrence, supra note
68, at 343.
2 Id. at 322.
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that there is an inherent conflict between femininity and compe-
tence."19 Given this context of widespread, unconscious sexism,
a low level of scrutiny for upper-level employment decisions is
inadequate to carry out the mandate of Title VII. In fact, the
susceptibility of subjective employment decisions to the influence of
unconscious biases makes close judicial scrutiny essential. When
judges use a low level of scrutiny, it is even easier for them to accept
employers' explanations for their decisions at face value. After all,
judges are influenced by the same unconscious biases that influence
employers, and chances are that neither side is aware of the
influence.
The unconscious sexism ofjudges, combined with an extremely
low level of scrutiny, may explain how the court of appeals came to
such a drastically different conclusion than the district court in
Ezold. The district court judge seemed aware of many of the subtle
factors that tend to work against women in upper-level jobs and was
able to place Ezold's individual stories in the larger context of
women workers as a group. He discussed gender stereotyping,
19 4
the fact that Ezold was held to a higher standard than male
associates, 195 and the inferiority of her work assignments19 6 as
examples of the way Ezold received different treatment than her
male counterparts. Thus, instead of ignoring the unconscious
sexism that seemed to have pervaded Ezold's workplace, the district
court judge applied traditional Title VII scrutiny to Wolf, Block's
decision and found it to be discriminatory.
197
The court of appeals, on the other hand, applied a lower level
of scrutiny to the case. 198 As a result, the unconscious sexism that
seemed to influence Wolf, Block's decision may have influenced the
Third Circuit's decision as well. A shortcoming in legal analytical
skills appeared to be a reasonable explanation for a denial of
partnership. 199 If Wolf, Block was not aware that subtle forms of
sexism inhibited Ezold's chances for partnership, there is no reason
'sTaub, supra note 30, at 356.
14 See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp 1175, 1189 (E.D.
Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
195 See id. at 1184-85.
196 See id. at 1178-79.
197 See id. at 1190-92.
'" See generally Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); see also supra notes 170-76 and accompanying
text.199 See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 533.
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to expect that a court affected by the same sexism would be any
more perceptive. This is especially true when that court is applying
an artificially lowered level of judicial scrutiny. Thus, whereas the
district court carefully examined the evidence in a broader context,
remaining aware that unconscious sexism could affect the decision
of a virtually all-male partnership, the court of appeals seemed to go
out of its way to deny that unconscious sexism played any part in
the decision.
20 0
For a variety of reasons, then, a lower degree of scrutiny for
upper-level employment discrimination cases will make it nearly
impossible for a plaintiff to succeed. The fact that upper-level cases
typically must be brought as individual disparate treatment cases will
prevent courts from seeing the subtle barriers outlined in Part I as
patterns and will make it more likely that an employer's articulated
reason for the decision will be believed. The high likelihood that
the fact-finder will be influenced by the same unconscious biases as
the employer means that the plaintiff will need to have dramatic
evidence of overt discrimination to convince the fact-finder that
discrimination occurred. Consequently, many cases of upper-level
discrimination will go undetected and unremedied.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
To eliminate the glass ceiling in the United States, courts must
change the way they approach upper-level employment
discrimination cases. The psychological and sociological factors that
keep women in less prestigious jobs will not disappear
spontaneously. The courts must therefore find an effective way to
remedy the discrimination that those factors inevitably cause. At a
time when global competitiveness is essential to the health of the
U.S. economy, we can no longer afford to live with a system that
drains organizational productivity.21 Before outlining a proposal
200 The court of appeals found nothing problematic about Wolf, Block's practice
of giving weight to the "comments of partners who had little contact and perhaps
knew nothing about an associate beyond the associate's general reputation." Id. at
532. The court concluded that this practice was not problematic because "[t]here is
no evidence that [it] ... was not applied equally to female and male associates." Id.
The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that industrial psychologists agree
that evaluations by those with little knowledge of the candidate are highly susceptible
to the influence of unconscious biases. See CASCIO, supra note 76, at 66; Radford,
supra note 31, at 488 n.65.
201 See Uma Sekaran & Frederick T.L. Leong, Introduction to WOMANPOWER:
MANAGING IN TIMES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TURBULENCE at ix, xi (Uma Sekaran &
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for applying increased judicial scrutiny, however, it is useful to
demonstrate why, despite some courts' hesitations, such scrutiny is
both necessary and appropriate.
A. An Exemption from Scrutiny Is Not Necessary
Courts and commentators point to a number of factors that
might explain judicial reluctance to scrutinize upper-level employ-
ment decisions. A careful examination of these factors, however,
reveals that none provides sound justification for the courts'
continued reluctance to exercise the full scope of their judicial
authority. The courts can overcome these perceived stumbling
blocks and develop schemes that will facilitate their review of upper-
level cases without unnecessarily impeding employer discretion.
One factor that has apparently deterred judges from fully scrutiniz-
ing high-level employment decisions is judges' close identification
with the employers involved. As Bartholet points out, however, this
lack of judicial distance is no excuse for judges to shirk their Title
VII duties in the upper-level employment context: "In dealing with
lower level jobs, the courts have had enough distance to weigh the
social cost of racial exclusion against the need for traditional
systems.... Judges must develop this same analytic distance in
looking at upper level selection systems."
20 2
A second factor that courts have invoked to avoid scrutinizing
upper-level decisions is their professed lack of expertise in making
employment decisions. 20s First, a lack of expertise should present
no more of a problem for upper-level cases than for lower-level
cases. In fact, judges are more likely to be familiar with the
professional world of law partnerships and academia than with the
blue-collar world of factories and construction crews. 20 4 Second,
even if lack of expertise did present greater problems in the upper-
level employment context, the difficulty of the factual inquiry would
still not justify an exemption from scrutiny. Courts are frequently
called upon to make complex, technical, factual inquiries in a
Frederick T.L. Leong eds., 1992) ("[E]ffective solutions [must] be generated to
enhance organizational productivity ... at a time when remaining competitive in the
global market is of critical importance to the United States.").
'=' Bartholet, supra note 4, at 980.
2o See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980)
(noting that, in the context of tenure decisions for college professors, judgments
about teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature are "beyond the
competence of individual judges").
231 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 979-80.
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variety of contexts. In other areas of the law, expert-witness
testimony is commonly used to educate fact-finders. 20 5 Lack of
expertise should be no more of a hindrance to the courts in
employment discrimination cases than in other areas of law.
A third, but equally unconvincing rationale used to justify the
courts' deference to upper-level employment decisions is the belief
that upper-level jobs are more important and less fungible than
lower-level jobs.2 6 The importance of these jobs, however, hardly
seems to justify the protection of systems that allocate them in a
discriminatory manner. If thesejobs truly are more important, then
every qualified individual should have an equal opportunity to
compete for them based on individual merit. The fact that "courts
feel that the quality of performance really matters"20 7 in upper-
level jobs does not justify leaving the assessment of employees'
performance to potentially bias-ridden systems. Rather, it suggests
a compelling reason for courts to scrutinize such decisions to ensure
that they are founded on meaningful criteria.
Finally, the courts are not justified in their concern that
scrutinizing upper-level employment decisions will take all decision-
making power away from employers. 208  This concern does not
keep courts from scrutinizing lower-level decisions, and likewise
should not keep them from scrutinizing upper-level decisions. Even
if this concern were uniquely applicable to upper-level decisions, it
could still be overcome. Some courts wrongly assume that there are
no viable alternatives available to replace overly subjective decision-
making systems for upper-level positions. 219 These courts fail to
recognize that subjectivity is a matter of degree. The fact that some
subjectivity is required when making upper-level employment deci-
sions does not imply that all elements of the subjective system play
a legitimate role in a fair, unbiased evaluation system. Judicial
scrutiny can screen out-and induce employers to screen out-
unnecessarily subjective evaluations while preserving legitimate
merit-based criteria. As outlined below, there are numerous ways
2
0
5 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note ("An intelligent evaluation of
facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most common source of this knowl-
edge is the expert witness, although there are other techniques for supplying it.").
206 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 957.
207 
Id.
' See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
2o9 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,527 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); see also supra note 126.
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to scrutinize subjective employmentjudgments while still preserving
a significant amount of employer discretion.
B. Increased Judicial Scrutiny for Upper-Level Cases
1. Employment Discrimination Law Should Be Applied
in a Context-Specific Fashion
Understanding that not all subjective decision-making systems
are alike is the key to enabling courts to scrutinize upper-level
employment decisions effectively, yet leave employers' legitimate
interests intact. Although some amount of subjectivity is required
when choosing employees for upper-level jobs, the courts need not
accept all such subjective decision-making systems at face value with
little or no judicial scrutiny. Thus, the courts should take into
account the arbitrariness of the employer's system before deciding
how much deference the employer's subjective judgment deserves.
Only employers who can prove that their decision-making processes
are neither arbitrary nor overly subjective should receive the low
level of scrutiny that characterizes many upper-level employment
discrimination cases today.21 All other employers should receive
traditional Title VII scrutiny. By taking the context in which the
employment decision was made into account in order to determine
which level of scrutiny should be applied, courts can help make the
three traditional theories of employment discrimination liability
more amenable to upper-level claims.
Under a context-specific application of employment discrimina-
tion theory,211 the employer would carry the burden of persuasion
in demonstrating to the fact-finder that its decision-making system
is not arbitrary or overly subjective. Only if the employer succeeds
in this effort would the lower level of scrutiny that the court of
appeals applied in the Ezold case be available. 212 In individual
disparate treatment cases,2 13 this lower level of scrutiny would
210 See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
21 A context-specific application of discrimination law would vary the level of
judicial scrutiny utilized in a case based on the context in which that decision was
made. For example, a decision made in an atmosphere of rampant sex stereotyping
and highly vague and subjective evaluation criteria would receive the traditional level
of Title VII scrutiny. A decision using well-defined and structured evaluation
instruments, made in an atmosphere that stresses the importance of unbiased
decision-making, would receive a lower level of scrutiny.21' See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
2 1 Because upper-level employment discrimination cases are usually brought
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translate into a presumption that the employer's articulated reason
was not a pretext for discrimination. Since the employer already
would have proven that the decision-making system in place was as
structured and objective as possible, the courts could more readily
accept the employer's representations that its employment decisions
were founded on merit, not bias. If the employer were able to
demonstrate that it had eliminated excessively subjective criteria,
the plaintiff, in order to prevail, would have to present "obvious or
manifest" evidence that the employer's "subjective standard was
unequally applied before a court [could] find pretext."
214
If the employer were unable to prove that its decision-making
system was not arbitrary or overly subjective, the court would apply
traditional Title VII scrutiny, much like the district court did in
Ezold. The arbitrary system in place would become one piece of
evidence that the plaintiff could use to establish pretext. Given that
the social and psychological factors at work in upper-level employ-
ment decisions2 15 are exacerbated by overly subjective decision-
making systems, 2 1 it would be illogical to assume that the employ-
er's decision was unbiased.2 17 Thus, instead of insisting that the
plaintiff's evidence of pretext be "obvious or manifest,"218 the
court would require the plaintiff to prove pretext by only a prepon-
derance of the evidence, 219 the traditional evidentiary burden in
under the individual disparate treatment theory, this analysis will focus on the way
courts should adjust their individual disparate treatment analysis according to the ar-
bitrariness of the employer's decision-making system. For a discussion of the reasons
that plaintiffs in upper-level cases usually use the individual disparate treatment
theory, see supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how courts
could adjust disparate impact analysis and systemic disparate treatment analysis based
on the arbitrariness of the employer's decision-making system, see infra note 220.
214 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 534 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). It is interesting to note that, earlier in its opinion,
the court stated that the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff would be to prove "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the employer's articulated reason was a pretext
for discrimination. Id. at 522. The court changed its standard to "obvious or mani-
fest" only after noting that the decision at issue was based on subjective factors. Id.
at 534.21
- See supra part I.A.
216 See supra part I.B.
217 Generally, courts presume that the employer's articulated reason is valid until
the plaintiff proves otherwise. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792,805 (1973). A context-specific proposal would eliminate this presumption when
the employer fails to prove that its selection process was not arbitrary or overly
subjective.
218 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 534.
219 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(noting that, once the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
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individual disparate treatment cases.22 This evidentiary scheme
would allow courts to overcome the individual disparate treatment
theory's focus on intent, an approach that fails to address uncon-
scious discrimination.
2 1
2. Factors To Consider
These distinctions between overly subjective systems and
permissibly subjective systems invite a difficult question: What
factors should courts consider when determining which employers
receive traditional Title VII scrutiny and which employers receive
the special lower level of scrutiny? The courts are not without
guidance in identifying these factors. A commonsense understand-
ing of the social and psychological factors that affect upper-level
employment decisions, 222 the EEOC's guidelines on employee
selection procedures, 223 and the recommendations of industrial
psychologists2 24 all suggest criteria that the courts can use to
distinguish valid decision-making systems from arbitrary, potentially
discriminatory ones. These criteria can help the courts determine
which subjective decisions deserve deference and which demand
careful scrutiny.
One factor the courts could consider is whether the employer
utilizes a system that monitors the distribution of work assignments.
As the Ezold case demonstrates, because women are often not given
rejecting the plaintiff, "the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination").
220 Although this section focuses on individual disparate treatment cases, a similar
analysis could be used for disparate impact cases and systemic disparate treatment
cases. One approach in disparate impact cases would be to allow a plaintiff to estab-
lish a claim by showing that: (1) the employer has failed to justify the subjectivity of
its decision-making process, raising a presumption of bias; and (2) the system has a
disproportionately negative effect on women. Another possible approach in disparate
impact cases would entitle the employer to a more lenient standard of business neces-
sity depending on the employer's ability to prove that its system was not unnecessarily
arbitrary. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (noting different standards
of business necessity). Finally, in systemic disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff who
could show that her employer's decision-making system was likely to be influenced by
biases could use this as evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
221 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 68, at 323 (noting, in the equal protection
context, that "requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a prerequisite
to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of what
we understand about how the human mind works").
' See supra part I.A.
223 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1993).
224 See, e.g., CASCIO, supra note 76, at 28-30.
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equally challenging assignments, they are not given the same chance
as men to demonstrate their skills or to develop new expertise.
225
This disparity is more likely to occur when assignments are
distributed in an informal, unmonitored manner. Courts should
therefore look for employers who have devised formal, structured
systems to monitor the allocation of work assignments. Such
systems allow employers to track the importance and complexity of
the work given to each employee in addition to an individual
employee's opportunities for exposure to influential decision-
makers. These monitoring mechanisms would afford employers a
more objective basis on which to assess whether they have evaluated
each employee based on demonstrated ability rather than precon-
ceived expectations of how certain types of workers will perform.
Another factor to consider when determining whether the
employer's decision-making process has a significant risk of bias is
the extent to which gender stereotyping pervades the
workplace.2 26 When stereotyping runs rampant in the workplace,
it is probably safe to presume that it will have some effect on
subjective judgments about women's performance and capabili-
ties. 22  Thus, courts should consider evidence concerning the
extent to which stereotyping has influenced the decision-making
process when determining which level of scrutiny an employer's
decisions deserve. This evidence can take the form of expert-
witness testimony,2 8 which was utilized in Price Waterhouse,229 or
simply testimony of the parties and other employees who can
describe the level of stereotyping that they observed in the work-
place.
" For Nancy Ezold, the problem of inequitable work assignments continued even
after she brought it to the attention of the partner responsible for assigning work in
her department and after that partner promised to correct the problem. She was as-
signed primarily small civil matters and was able to work with only a limited number
of partners. On one occasion, although Ezold was the only associate to volunteer for
a particular project, within an hour the assigning partner reassigned it to a male
associate without any explanation. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen,
751 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
22 See supra part I.A.3.
1 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (noting that
stereotyping can be used as evidence to show that discrimination played a part in an
employment decision).
22 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
229 See 490 U.S. at 255-56 (accepting the testimony of a social psychologist who
discerned sex stereotyping in the partners' evaluations of the plaintiff, and rejecting
the defendant's characterization of that testimony as "gossamer evidence").
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There are a number of steps an employer can take to reduce the
level of unnecessary subjectivity in a subjective evaluation process.
All of these steps should be factors that the court takes into account
when deciding whether the employer's decision-making process is
likely to be free from bias. One way an employer can reduce the
level of subjectivity is to allow only those who are truly familiar with
a candidate's performance to make employment decisions about
that candidate. Industrial psychologists have warned that uncon-
scious biases are more likely to be expressed when the evaluator has
not had an adequate opportunity to observe the candidate. 23 0 For
this reason, the decision-maker should ideally be the candidate's
supervisor or someone else who has had the opportunity to work
directly with the candidate.23 ' If this is not possible, the decision-
maker should at least be given primary sources to evaluate, such as
examples of the candidate's actual work product, as opposed to only
secondary sources, such as evaluations written by others.
Employers can also reduce unnecessary subjectivity by taking a
variety of steps to eliminate vagueness in the evaluation process
itself. First, the employer can train evaluators to ensure that they
use the same standards and techniques. The EEOC guidelines
suggest that this training should include an explanation of the
factors to be taken into account, clear definitions of all terms and
rating scales, and techniques to recognize and eliminate the effects
of stereotyping and biases.212 Second, all evaluations should be in
writing and preserved in the candidate's personnel file in the event
of a future disagreement. Finally, employers can reduce unneces-
sary subjectivity by allowing several people to view each candidate's
work product. This could be accomplished either by establishing a
formal committee or by a less formal but consistently applied
practice of seeking second and third opinions before important
employment decisions are made. Thus, the employer in Gillespie v.
Wisconin, whose test included a detailed grading system,
established rating criteria, well-trained graders, and a thorough
2SO See CAscIo, supra note 76, at 66.
"' See id. at 77 (noting that "raters must have direct experience with, or firsthand
knowledge of, the individual to be rated").
2 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(2) (1993) ("In view of the possibility of bias in
subjective evaluations, supervisory rating techniques and instructions to raters should
be carefully developed."); CAscIo, supra note 76, at 77 (suggesting that raters be
"trained in the techniques of rating").
3 771 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986).
314 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143 267
validation test,2 4 would be entitled to substantially more defer-
ence than the employer in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,2 15 whose
employment decisions were made by store managers with no
practical constraints on discretion using unwritten criteria that were
both ambiguous and subjective.
2
3
6
A number of other factors can also be considered as evidence
that an employer has significantly reduced the risk of biased
employment decisions. Efforts to advertise job openings and
publicize details of the selection criteria indicate that an employer
has attempted to make it easier for all candidates to compete with
the same information. The courts should also look for decision-
making bodies that are as diverse as possible; all-male committees
may be less cognizant of latent gender biases than committees
composed of both men and women. Also, in fields in which
informal social networks can be important, the courts should
recognize companies that attempt to reduce women's disadvantages
in this area. Although companies neither can nor should eliminate
spontaneous sex-segregated socializing, company-sponsored social
events that are open and attractive to all can ensure that all
employees have opportunities to interact socially with some of the
more influential players, who remain predominantly male.
3. Ezold as a Case in Point
Applying the context-specific disparate treatment approach to
a concrete upper-level employment controversy demonstrates the
proposal's practical operation. It is thus informative to outline the
analysis that the court would have followed had it followed this
approach in the Ezold3 7 case. Once Ezold proved a prima facie case
of discrimination, Wolf, Block would then carry the burden of
persuasion in demonstrating that its partnership selection system
was not likely to be influenced by bias. In its effort to meet this
burden, Wolf, Block could point to its reasonably well-structured
and formal evaluation process, which included written evaluations
and evaluation forms that explicitly described the characteristics to
be judged and the meaning of each possible grade.
234 See id. at 1037-39.
" 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2 See id. at 331.
17 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
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Ezold, on the other hand, could point to a number of other
factors that make it likely that Wolf, Block's system was influenced
by gender bias. First, there was a substantial amount of evidence
that she was not given the same kind of work assignments as male
associates. 218 Her assignments were primarily small matters, she
had relatively little contact with partners in her department, and the
assignment process was largely informal and unsupervised.
2s 9
Second, all partners, regardless of the extent of their familiarity with
the associate's work, were expected to complete evaluations of all
associates, reducing the likelihood that their evaluations represented
legitimate performance-based assessments and increasing the
likelihood that they represented unfounded impressions.240 Third,
Ezold could point to evidence of sex stereotyping at Wolf, Block.
During the hiring process, a male partner told Ezold that it would
not be easy for her at Wolf, Block because she was, among other
things, a woman. 24 1 Furthermore, when Ezold expressed concern
about the treatment of the firm's paralegals, who were virtually all
female, she was criticized for being too involved in women's
issues. 242 In contrast, when a male attorney brought up the issue of
part-time attorneys, which even he admitted was "well known to be
a women's issue," there was no similar criticism. 243 Ezold was
criticized for being too assertive and demanding, whereas several
male associates received negative evaluations for not being assertive
enough. 244 Finally, top decision-makers at the firm did not view
the fact that a male associate had generated numerous sexual
harassment complaints from secretaries and paralegals as relevant
to that associate's eligibility for partnership.
245
2" See id. at 1178-79.
2s9 see id.
2140 See id. at 1180; see also supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
24 See 751 F. Supp. at 1177.
242 See id. at 1188.
24- Id.; see also Rhode, supra note 3, at 1191 ("In corporate cultures, 'making too
much of the "woman issue"' carries substantial professional risk. As a consequence,
female executives have often treated the subject as 'taboo,' which perpetuates the
attitudes giving rise to the 'woman's issue' in the first instance." (footnotes omitted)).
244 See 751 F. Supp. at 1189.
245 See id. at 1188. The Chairman of the Associates Committee testified that one
incident, in which the associate allegedly "touched and flirted in an unwelcome
fashion" with a secretary, was not "relevant to considerations of whether [he] was an
acceptable candidate for partnership," even though the Chairman did not find the
associate's account of the incident to be credible. Consequently, the Chairman did
not report the incident to the Associates Committee. Id.
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Based on this evidence, it seems likely that the fact-finder would
determine that Wolf, Block had not met its burden in demonstrat-
ing that its decision-making system was likely to be free from bias.
Thus, the artificially low level of scrutiny that the court of appeals
applied would be inappropriate. 246 Instead, Wolf, Block's decision
not to admit Ezold into the partnership would receive normal Title
VII scrutiny. Rather than requiring Ezold to come forward with
evidence that makes it "obvious or manifest" that she was treated
differently than male associates,247 the context-specific disparate
treatment approach would require Ezold to prove her case only by
a preponderance of the evidence-the traditional evidentiary burden
placed on plaintiffs in individual disparate treatment cases.
248
4. A Legal Incentive to Improve the Decision-Making Process
Giving employers a legal incentive to develop decision-making
procedures that are less likely to be influenced by bias is not
without precedent. For example, courts have used a similar
approach in addressing the problem of sexual harassment. When
determining an employer's liability for one employee's sexual
harassment of another employee, courts consider whether the
employer has established a grievance procedure for, and a company
policy against, sexual harassment.24 9 If an employer has taken
adequate steps to redress and prevent the recurrence of sexual
harassment, courts reduce or even completely eliminate that
employer's liability for the sexual harassment of its employee.
250
' See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
247 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 534 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
24 The Ezold district court applied this standard. See 751 F. Supp. at 1191; see also
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981) (establishing
preponderance of the evidence standard in individual disparate treatment cases).
249 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (noting that these
considerations are "plainly relevant" to determination of liability); Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.) (applying Meritor standard of employer
liability), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122,
1125 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340,
343 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th
Cir. 1989) (same); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,899-900 (lst Cir.
1988) (same).
0 The Mentor Court implied that when an employer has a strong policy against
sexual harassment and the plaintiff, for no apparent reason, fails to resort to the
employer's established grievance procedure, the employer may be completely
insulated from liability. See 477 U.S. at 72-73.
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In this way, the courts give employers an incentive to take prophy-
lactic measures to prevent harassment.
Employment law is not the only area in which courts reward de-
fendants by granting greater deference to institutions with proper
procedures in place. In corporate law, the business judgment rule
performs a similar function. When determining whether a decision
made by a corporation's directors or officers fulfills the duty of
care, the court examines the process on which the decision-makers
relied in reaching the decision. When the court is convinced that
the decision-makers have taken adequate steps to eliminate self-
interest, have considered all relevant factors, and have exercised an
informed, expert judgment, the court reduces the scrutiny with
which it reviews the substance of the decisions, requiring that the
decision be only rational as opposed to reasonable.2 51 The busi-
ness judgment rule thus deters arbitrary, haphazard decisions by
rewarding corporate directors who follow proper decision-making
methods.
Similarly, the courts can induce employers to rely only on
relevant employment-related factors rather than on unfounded
biases by establishing a Title VII analysis that affords greater
deference to employers willing to minimize the impact of bias by
implementing structured, controlled processes. The courts' current
application of Title VII in the upper-level employment context
provides exactly the opposite incentive: the more subjective and
arbitrary (and thus potentially bias-ridden) a decision-making system
is, the more likely some courts are to defer to the judgments that
emerge from this system.252  By rewarding more disciplined,
The EEOC also emphasizes the relevance of preventive techniques in its Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their
right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
25 See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1992); see also Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (stating that the "business judgment rule
exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power"
granted to directors).
1 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 529-30 (3d
Cir. 1992) (noting that the district court should not have exercised its fact-finding
function to make determinations about Ezold's legal analytical ability in face of
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principled evaluation methods with greater judicial deference, the
courts can encourage employers to eliminate unnecessary subjective
elements from their processes.
5. Responses to Potential Criticism
Asking courts to distinguish between employers with arbitrary
and nonarbitrary decision-making systems should not be problema-
tic. First, courts already make this distinction when lower-level jobs
are at stake. In those cases, courts seem perfectly capable of deter-
mining whether the subjectivity in a decision-making system is ne-
cessary to select the best employees or whether it leads to arbitrary,
unfounded decisions. 25  Second, courts are called upon to make
close factual judgments of this kind in many other types of cases as
well. In reviewing corporate decision-making, for example, the fact-
finder must decide whether the corporation's stated reasons are
mere post hoc rationalizations to mask more arbitrary actions, or
whether the surrounding facts lend the decision-makers an aura of
credibility. 2"4 Neither the necessarily fact-intensive nature of this
inquiry nor the elusiveness of decisive evidence has deterred courts
from adjudicating which corporate decision-making processes violate
the law. Third, the burden-shifting principles of this context-specific
Title VII analysis make it a judicially manageable approach, even in
close cases. The employer would bear the burden of persuasion on
the validity of its decision-making system, leading to a traditional
level of Title VII scrutiny whenever the employer cannot demon-
strate that it has reduced the level of bias in its decision-making
process.
Another potential concern may be that providing a lower level
of scrutiny to employers in certain employment discrimination cases
conflicting evidence, because factors that Wolf, Block considered were subjective
instead of objective), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ.,
941 F.2d 154,181 (3d Cir. 1991) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting from denial of petition for
rehearing) (stating that the court should not review subjective academic tenure and
promotion decisions unless "the evidence of discriminatory action is unmistakable"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548
(3d Cir. 1980) (stating that the court should leave subjective determinations to
professionals familiar with the field, unless such determinations are clearly discrimina-
tory).
253 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872
(stating that the business judgment rule presumes that in making a business decision,
"the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company").
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will allow some real cases of discrimination to pass undetected and
unremedied by the courts. Under the context-specific proposal,
however, only employers who have demonstrated that their decision-
making systems are not unnecessarily vague and subjective will be
entitled to this lower level of scrutiny, whereas currently, virtually
all employers, regardless of the uncontrolled subjectivity of their
systems, have enjoyed minimal judicial scrutiny by some courts. The
possibility that some subtle forms of discrimination will go undetect-
ed under the context-specific proposal does not justify maintaining
the current jurisprudence, under which even more blatant forms of
discrimination go unremedied.
Other critics might argue that employers can circumvent the
courts' attempts to scrutinize subjective decision-making systems
simply by following formalities and inventing neutral explanations
while still relying on their personal biases and preferences.
Although it is true some employers will remain intent on promoting
only certain types of employees, most employers simply want to
promote the most deserving candidates. A context-specific
application of employment discrimination theories, by giving these
well-intentioned employers the incentive to implement systems that
minimize the impact of unconscious biases, will make this goal more
achievable.
A context-specific approach also withstands criticism from those
who fear that judicial scrutiny will unfairly burden defendant
employers, forcing them to alter decision-making systems that have
never been proven to be discriminatory. This approach, however,
leaves employers broad latitude to devise a satisfactory way to
comply with Title VII. An employer need only modify its proce-
dures if it seeks the advantage of less scrutiny and greater deference
should the validity of its employment decisions come before a court.
Keeping potentially bias-ridden procedures in place will not
necessarily lead to liability; it will merely lead to normal Title VII
scrutiny in the event of an employment discrimination suit. Thus,
employers are free to weigh the costs and benefits of the various
strategies. For instance, an employer who believes that its present
system is not disproportionately impeding women's advancement
might reasonably decide that its system would survive ordinary Title
VII scrutiny and should be maintained. By contrast, an employer
with ambiguous criteria and unstructured processes might rationally
determine that refashioning its hiring system is necessary to
minimize judicial scrutiny and reduce its exposure to liability. Most
of the measures necessary to minimize subjectivity can be
320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:267
implemented at relatively low cost to the employer and are
consistent with employers' overall objective of promoting the most
qualified employees. Thus, the possibility that judicial scrutiny
might cause some nondiscriminating employers to modify their
systems is not particularly problematic.
CONCLUSION
In the thirty years since the enactment of Title VII, women have
made significant gains toward equal employment in jobs carrying
low to medium amounts of prestige and power. In the uppermost
reaches of many professions, however, women are still drastically
underrepresented. Studies indicate that this persistent problem is
not merely the result of women's different career choices or
vocational abilities. Rather, a number of sociological and psycho-
logical factors make upper-level employment more elusive for
women than for men. The persistence of highly subjective, discre-
tionary decision-making, which fails to control the unexamined and
often unconscious biases of the professional elite who make most
upper-level employment decisions, exacerbates this phenomenon.
Because this cadre of high-level professionals remains predomi-
nantly male, the biases that pervade the upper ranks of the job
market continue to favor male workers over their female
counterparts.
Because traditional Title VII analyses are ill-suited to the small
statistical samples and unconscious barriers that usually are
associated with upper-level cases, the courts must begin to rethink
their approach. A context-specific approach to employment dis-
crimination law would provide the courts with a more effective
weapon with which to fight upper-level employment discrimination.
Reserving a highly deferential approach for only those employers
who demonstrate that their decision-making systems are not
arbitrary will provide employers with an incentive to modify their
procedures before discrimination occurs. Furthermore, utilizing a
traditional level of Title VII scrutiny for all other employers will
increase the likelihood that past discriminatory decisions will be
identified and remedied. After all, 475 years is too long to wait for
equal opportunity for women.
2 55
2" See MORRISON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 (citing a prediction of the Feminist
Majority Foundation).
